Information and Veridicality: Information Processing and the Bar-Hillel/Carnap Paradox

Fresco, Nir; Michael, Michaelis

doi:10.1086/684165

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If so, then silence supposedly qualifies as disembodied information. However, it does not qualify as information per se, but rather as being informative as part of an inferential process that includes other background information [88]. 9 For a similar reason, Scarantino, for example, deems natural information "an objective commodity" that is nonetheless "minddependent" [14] (p. 432) relativised to potential receivers.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

Fresco

2022

Philosophies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information.

show abstract

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

Fresco

2022

Philosophies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…14 For two excellent analyses to which I am indebted see and Jenkins and Kasaki (2015), see also Casullo and Thurow (2013), and Casullo (forthcoming). 15 An important topic that I hope to explore thoroughly in the future is the connection between maker's knowledge and "instructional information" (see Floridi (2011a)), "control information" [see Corning (2007)] and A. Sloman (http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/whats-information.html) and "information how" [see Fresco (2016)]. As one of the anonymous reviewers remarked: "In this type of information, both affordances and success criteria play a key role, and the agent exercising instructional information enjoys a special epistemic status similar to maker's knowledge".…”

Section: Maker's Knowledge: Different Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I provide reasons in its favour in Floridi (2007) and Floridi (2011a). Opponents of the veridicality thesis, like Colburn (2000a, b), Dodig-Crnkovic (2005), Ferguson (2015), Fetzer (2004), Fresco and Michael (2016), and Scarantino and Piccinini (2010) may find it necessary. In this article, the veridicality thesis plays no role, since the starting assumption is that Alice knows p, and hence any analysis of p, whether informational or not, must presuppose the truth of p. 3 So throughout this article, agents deal with information that is actually true, not with information that they think is true but may be false (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld 1997).…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

What a maker’s knowledge could be

Floridi

2016

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Three classic distinctions specify that truths can be necessary versus contingent,analytic versus synthetic, and a priori versus a posteriori. The philosopher reading this article knows very well both how useful and ordinary such distinctions are in our conceptual work and that they have been subject to many and detailed debates, especially the last two. In the following pages, I do not wish to discuss how far they may be tenable. I shall assume that, if they are reasonable and non problematic in some ordinary cases, then they can be used in order to understand what kind of knowledge the maker's knowledge is. By this I mean the sort of knowledge that Alice enjoys when she holds the information (true content) that Bob's coffee is sweetened because she just put two spoons of sugar in it herself. The maker's knowledge tradition is quite important but it is not mainstream in modern and analytic epistemology and lacks grounding in terms of exactly what sort of knowledge one is talking about. My suggestion is that this grounding can be provided by a minimalist approach, based on an information-theoretical analysis. In the article, I argue that (a) we need to decouple a fourth distinction, namely informative versus uninformative, from the previous three and, in particular, from its implicit association with analytic versus synthetic and a priori versus a posteriori; (b) such a decoupling facilitates, and is facilitated by, moving from a monoagent to a multiagent approach: the distinctions qualify a proposition, a message, or some information not just in themselves but relationally, with respect to an informational agent; (c) the decoupling and the multiagent approach enable a re-mapping of currently available positions in epistemology (Classic, Innatist, Kant's and Kripke's) on these four dichotomies; (d) within such a re-mapping, two positions, capturing the nature of a witness' knowledge and of a maker's knowledge,

show abstract

Objective Information, Intersubjectivity, and Popper’s Three Worlds

Fresco

2021

Karl Popper's Science and Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Information and Veridicality: Information Processing and the Bar-Hillel/Carnap Paradox

Cited by 4 publications

References 46 publications

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

What a maker’s knowledge could be

Objective Information, Intersubjectivity, and Popper’s Three Worlds

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About