Inscrutability and ontological commitment

Brogaard, Berit

doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9261-x

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…48 See Heil (2003) and Heil (2012, §8.5), Armstrong (2004, §2.14), and Cameron (2008. 49 For other discussions of Cameron's view, see Brogaard (2008) and Schaffer (2008). difference above.…”

Section: Ross Cameron's Truthmaker Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The General Truthmaker View of ontological commitment

Rettler

2015

Philos Stud

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In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the ''General Truthmaker View'': when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something (or some things) that makes (or make) true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not ontologically committed to the truthmakers of our sentences.

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Section: Ross Cameron's Truthmaker Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The General Truthmaker View of ontological commitment

Rettler

2015

Philos Stud

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“…La teoría de la gravitación newtoniana predice entonces que, en estas regiones, la velocidad de rotación de las estrellas debiera variar en proporción inversa a la raíz cuadrada de la distancia al centro galáctico y a la disminución relativa de la cantidad de masa. Sin embargo, se ha encontrado en una muestra variada de casos que la velocidad de rotación de las galaxias espiraladas permanece relativamente constante con el aumento de la distancia al núcleo galáctico o incluso se incrementa 3 Brogaard (2008) reconstruye el criterio quineano de compromiso ontológico y expone una serie de consecuencias contraintuitivas derivadas de su aplicación bajo condiciones lógicas (o lógico-modales) específicas. En particular, Brogaard muestra que la aplicación de ese criterio a una teoría contradictoria T conlleva que T nos comprometa ontológicamente con todas las entidades.…”

Section: Galaxias Inconsistentesunclassified

<b>Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan

Guirado

2015

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

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RESUMEN. Según Mark Colyvan, algunos desarrollos científicos maduros (en particular: la cosmología newtoniana, la oceanografía descriptiva, el cálculo temprano y la teoría cuántica de Dirac) contienen presupuestos contradictorios, los cuales habilitan prima facie la adopción de un realismo naturalizado de entidades inconsistentes. Un aspecto exótico del planteo de Colyvan es la pretensión de que el realismo en cuestión emana de la aplicación de los parámetros de evaluación de teorías involucrados en la epistemología de Quine. Si bien esta pretensión es altamente controversial, no será analizada en el presente trabajo. Mi intención es, simplemente, mostrar que las teorías comprometidas en el análisis de Colyvan no exhiben las propiedades requeridas para promover una metafísica de entidades contradictorias filosóficamente respetable. Las tesis que defiendo al respecto son: (i) que la cosmología newtoniana y la oceanografía descriptiva no envuelven elementos genuinamente inconsistentes y (ii) que las inconsistencias presentes en el cálculo temprano y la teoría cuántica de Dirac respectivamente manifiestan una eficacia metodológica lo suficientemente endeble como para que su empleo no demande racionalmente una cobertura realista.Palabras-clave: realismo científico, entidades inconsistentes, Quine, metodología de la ciencia, Mark Colyvan. Scientific realism and inconsistencies. Critique to Colyvan's metaphysicsABSTRACT. According to Mark Colyvan, certain mature scientific developments (specifically, Newtonian cosmology, descriptive oceanography, early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory) contain contradictory assumptions, and this enables the prima facie adoption of certain naturalized realism of inconsistent entities. An exotic aspect of Colyvan's proposal is the claim that the resulting variety of realism emerges from the mere application of the parameters of theory evaluation involved in Quine's epistemology. While this is a highly controversial claim in itself, it will not be analyzed in this paper. My intention is to show that the theories put forward by Colyvan do not exhibit the properties required to promote a philosophically respectable metaphysics of contradictory entities. The theses defended are: (i) neither Newtonian cosmology nor descriptive oceanography exhibits any genuine contradiction; (ii) the apparent inconsistencies in early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory respectively exhibit a weak enough methodological effectivity so that their use do not rationally demand a realistic recovery.Keywords: scientific realism, inconsistent entities, Quine, scientific methodology, Mark Colyvan. IntroducciónMark Colyvan se propuso en trabajos relativamente recientes esbozar un realismo de entidades inconsistentes sustentado en la filosofía de la ciencia de Quine (COLYVAN, 2008a, b;2009). El enfoque quineano exige traducir las oraciones de una teoría al lenguaje de la lógica cuantificacional elemental para revelar sus compromisos ontológicos. Estos compromisos se harán manifiestos al determinar el dominio de enti...

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“…Nonetheless the claim that the objectual quantifier quantifies over a domain of mind and language independent objects is a postulate and is not guaranteed by the semantic condition for the quantifier. Even if it has been determined that “there are Fs” commits us to Fs, and that “there are Fs” is true, we cannot necessarily conclude that there really are Fs (see Brogaard, ; Eklund, ). In order to get to this further conclusion we need to adopt a stance whereby objectual reference is sufficient for existence.…”

Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 99%

Abstract Singular Terms and Thin Reference

Duke

2012

Theoria

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The prevailing approach to the problem of the ontological status of mathematical entities such as numbers and sets is to ask in what sense it is legitimate to ascribe a reference to abstract singular terms; those expressions of our language which, taken at face value, denote abstract objects. On the basis of this approach, neo-Fregean Abstractionists such as Hale and Wright have argued that abstract singular terms may be taken to effect genuine reference towards objects, whereas nominalists such as Field have asserted that these apparent ontological commitments should not be taken at face value. In this article I argue for an intermediate position which upholds the legitimacy of ascribing a reference to abstract singular terms in an attenuated sense relative to the more robust ascription of reference applicable to names denoting concrete entities. In so doing I seek to clear up some confusions regarding the ramifications of such a thin notion of reference for ontological claims about mathematical objects.Keywords: reference, abstract singular terms, ontology, abstract objects 1 Charles Parsons (2008, p. 1) captures the standard contemporary meaning of the term "abstract object" when he characterizes it as referring to objects that are "not located in space and time" and which do not "stand in causal relations." Mathematical entities such as numbers, geometrical shapes and sets are thus paradigmatic abstract objects. 2 Although the framework for all three assumptions is Fregean, it is significant that the joint paper by Nelson Goodman and W. V. O. Quine, "Steps towards a Constructive Nominalism" (1947), is the earliest frequently cited paper which frames the problem of "abstract" entities in terms of assumption (ii).ABSTRACT SINGULAR TERMS AND THIN REFERENCE 277

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Inscrutability and ontological commitment

Cited by 10 publications

References 34 publications

The General Truthmaker View of ontological commitment

The General Truthmaker View of ontological commitment

<b>Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan

Abstract Singular Terms and Thin Reference

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