The Microfinance Revolution: An Overview

Sengupta, Rajdeep; Aubuchon, Craig P.

doi:10.3886/icpsr21580

Cited by 7 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In general, MF programs appear to have increased access to credit among those who would not typically have such access, produced high rates of repayment, and increased per capita household consumption (especially as a result of women’s borrowing) and school enrollment (Chemin 2008; Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008; Khandker 2005). Specific features of these programs may make them more or less successful in different circumstances.…”

Section: Does Microfinance “Empower” Women and What Are The Implicatimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, group loan lending may be less successful than individual lending in urban areas, or in low density rural areas; and dynamic incentives may be less effective where there is greater competition among MF institutions (Navajas et al 2000). Further, research suggests that it is the marginally poor, rather than the poorest of the poor who benefit most from these programs (Chemin 2008; Morduch 1999, Sengupta and Aubochon 2008; Navajas et al 2000). Some therefore argue that those who are most at risk of HIV are overlooked as viable MF program participants due to way in which microfinance business practices tend to designate those most in need as lacking “creditworthiness” (Jurik 2005).…”

Section: Does Microfinance “Empower” Women and What Are The Implicatimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…MF programs are implemented in many varied ways (e.g., Morduch 1999; Copestake 2007; Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008), but some frequent features include group lending (small groups are formed voluntarily, loans are made to individuals within the groups, but all members are held responsible for loan repayment); progressive lending and dynamic incentives (loan size is increased with successful loan repayment); frequent and almost immediate loan repayment schedule; (often) compulsory savings (a portion of the loan placed in a group fund and strict rules for withdrawal applied); and either no collateral required or collateral substitutes permitted. Over time, and with success, MF institutions have added to these services by, for example, providing a variety of savings options, more flexible loan repayment, pension plans, insurance (debt relief with death of borrower, health insurance, natural disaster insurance), and business development services (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008; Sievers and Vandenberg 2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Over time, and with success, MF institutions have added to these services by, for example, providing a variety of savings options, more flexible loan repayment, pension plans, insurance (debt relief with death of borrower, health insurance, natural disaster insurance), and business development services (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008; Sievers and Vandenberg 2007). Although MF programs have often been run by institutions in the non-profit sector relying on donor financing, their success has prompted growing interest among commercial financial institutions leading some to question whether the former’s emphasis on social performance and poverty reduction is jeopardized by the latter’s emphasis on profitability and financial performance (e.g., Copestake 2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Microfinance and HIV/AIDS Prevention: Assessing its Promise and Limitations

Dworkin¹,

2009

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Researchers increasingly argue that poverty and gender inequality exacerbate the spread of HIV/AIDS and that economic empowerment can therefore assist in the prevention and mitigation of the disease, particularly for women. This paper critically evaluates such claims. First, we examine the promises and limits of integrated HIV/AIDS prevention and microfinance programs by examining the available evidence base. We then propose future research agendas and next steps that may help to clear current ambiguities about the potential for economic programs to contribute to HIV/AIDS risk reduction efforts.

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Section: Does Microfinance “Empower” Women and What Are The Implicatimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Does Microfinance “Empower” Women and What Are The Implicatimentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Microfinance and HIV/AIDS Prevention: Assessing its Promise and Limitations

Dworkin¹,

2009

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“…Moral risk, or moral hazard, is the situation in which the borrower can get involved in activities that increase his/her probability of defaulting because the risks are completely or, at least, partially borne by the lender (Pischke, 1991;Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008). Simply put, moral risk exists whenever a borrower, knows that ultimately someone else -for example, the lender -will bear the cost for any unpaid loans.…”

Section: Moral and Adverse Selection Risks: The Credit Dilemma And Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lending Groups and Different Social Capitals in Developed and Developing Countries

2016

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ResumoGrupos de empréstimo (GEs) e capital social são elementos primordiais para as muitas soluções em operações de microfinanças ao redor do mundo. No entanto, a capacidade dos GEs para reduzir os custos e os riscos de transações das instituições de microfinanças (IFM) são mediados pelo ambiente institucional. A partir desse pressuposto, discutimos as interações existentes entre os ambientes institucionais dos países desenvolvidos (anglosaxões e comunitários) e os países em desenvolvimento com diferentes estoques de capital social (individual, em rede e institucional), bem como as influências dessa interação sobre a eficácia dos GEs. Para tanto, construímos, a partir da perspectiva institucional de O. Williamson, um framework teórico que coloca em interação todos esses elementos e que permite analisar as suas principais relações dentro do contexto deste estudo. Com base nesse framework, propomos que, nos países em desenvolvimento e nos países anglo-saxões, tanto o estoque de capital social individual quanto o em rede são os mais importantes para a eficácia dos GEs. No entanto, em países anglosaxões, esses dois estoques de capital social são complementados por dispositivos formais de contratação. Nos países comunitários desenvolvidos, porém, os estoques de capital social institucional têm um impacto positivo mais forte sobre a dinâmica dos GEs.Palavras-chave: microfinança; grupos de empréstimo; capital social; ambiente institucional. AbstractLending groups (LGs) and social capital are two central elements to the many microfinance solutions operating around the world. However, LG effectiveness in reducing transaction costs and lending risks for microfinance institutions (MFIs) is mediated by institutional environments. Starting from this assumption, we discuss the existent interactions between the institutional environments of developed (Anglo-Saxon and communitarian) and developing countries with different stocks of social capital (individual, network and institutional) and the influences of this interaction on LG effectiveness. In order to do so, we applied the institutional perspective of O. Williamson to build a theoretical framework to examine the interaction of all these conditions, allowing for analysis of their main relations within the microfinance context. Based on this framework, we propose on the one hand that in developing and Anglo-Saxon developed nations, stocks of both individual and network social capital are the most important for an LG's effectiveness. However, in Anglo-Saxon countries, these two stocks of social capital are complemented by formal contracting devices. In communitarian developed countries, on the other hand, the stocks of institutional social capital have a stronger positive impact on LG dynamics.

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