The Macrostructure of Informal Arguments: A Proposed Model and Analysis

Ricco, Robert B.

doi:10.1080/02724980244000701

Cited by 11 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…The little research that does exist in this area is mixed. Some studies (e.g., Ricco 2003, cited by M&S) suggest that for simple arguments, adults can, when prompted, differentiate between linked and convergent arguments. Other studies, however, suggest that, even for simple arguments, untrained college students can identify the conclusion but without prompting are poor at both identifying the premises and how the premises support the conclusion (Harrell 2006;2011).…”

Section: Conclusion L Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Mercier¹,

2011

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Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found. Abstract: Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all the...

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Section: Conclusion L Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Mercier¹,

2011

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“…They can follow the commitments of the different speakers and determine, at any given point of the argument, who has the burden of proof (Bailenson & Rips, 1996;Rips, 1998). They understand the macrostructure of arguments (Ricco, 2003). They are often able to spot the classical fallacies of argumentation, such as ad hominem, petitio principii (begging the question), or circular reasoning (Neuman, Glassner, & Weinstock, 2004;Neuman, Weinstock, & Glasner, 2006;Rips, 2002;Weinstock, Neuman, & Tabak, 2004).…”

Section: Are People Good At Arguing?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuitive and reflective inferences

Mercier¹,

Sperber²

2009

In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond

116

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Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning (Evans, 2003, in press; for arguments against, see Osman, 2004). There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting featuresslow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central -that, depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As Evans states in a recent review, "it would then be helpful to have some clear basis for this distinction"; he also suggests that "we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes" rather than systems (Evans, in press). We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system theories. Our goal here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of inferences: 'intuitive inference' and 'reflective inference' (or reasoning proper). We ground this distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication (rather than to help individual ratiocination). This function, we claim, helps explain important aspects of reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support to this approach. Disciplines Cognition and Perception | Philosophy of Mind | Social Psychology | Theory and PhilosophyThis book chapter is available at

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“…This assessment is made explicit through criteria evaluating a) the "use of pre-defined argument schemes", such as those proposed by Walton (1996) or the argument structures used by Ricco (2003) or Neuman (2003); b) the "use of correct and valid evidence" and/or the avoidance of pseudoevidence (Kuhn, 1991); and c) the "explicit relations" among argument elements/premises, either through diagramming arguments (Lund, Molinari, Séjourné, & Baker, 2007), or as a verbal justification of the relation between claims and evidence (Sandoval & Millwood, 2008;McNeill, 2008).…”

Section: Argument Assessment Criteriamentioning

confidence: 99%

What Is Meant by Argumentative Competence? An Integrative Review of Methods of Analysis and Assessment in Education

Rapanta

García-Milà

Gilabert

2013

Review of Educational Research

160

110

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The need to enhance argument skills through education has become increasingly evident during the last 20 years. This need has resulted in an ongoing discussion that focuses on students' and teachers' argumentation, and its support. However, apart from the extended competence-based discourse, no clear and homogeneous definition exists for argumentative competence and its constituent skills. To respond to this deficiency, we conducted an integrative literature review focusing on the methods of argument analysis and assessment that have been proposed thus far in the field of education. Specifically, we constructed an interpretative framework to organize the information contained in 97 reviewed studies in a coherent and meaningful way. The main result of the framework's application is the emergence of three levels of argumentative competence, namely, metacognitive, metastrategic, and epistemological competence. We consider this result the beginning of further research on the psycho-pedagogical nature of argument skills and their manifestation as competent performance.

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The Macrostructure of Informal Arguments: A Proposed Model and Analysis

Cited by 11 publications

References 38 publications

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Intuitive and reflective inferences

What Is Meant by Argumentative Competence? An Integrative Review of Methods of Analysis and Assessment in Education

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