Intuitive and reflective inferences

Abstract

Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning (Evans, 2003, in press; for arguments against, see Osman, 2004). There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting featuresslow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central -that, depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As Evans states in a recent review, "it would then be helpful to have some clear basis for this distinction"; he also suggests that "we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes" rather than systems (Evans, in press). We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system theories. Our goal here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of inferences: 'intuitive inference' and 'reflective inference' (or reasoning proper). We ground this distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication (rather than to help individual ratiocination). This function, we claim, helps explain important aspects of reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support to this approach. Disciplines Cognition and Perception | Philosophy of Mind | Social Psychology | Theory and PhilosophyThis book chapter is available at

On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning

“…Even within the more restricted area of reasoning there are substantial differences between competing dual process theories (Osman, 2004). I will focus here on a particular version of this distinction, that between intuitive and reflective inferences (Mercier & Sperber, 2009). This theory proposes a principled distinction between the two categories of processes.…”

“…On the other hand, reflective inferences (or reasoning) are characterized by the attention they pay to reasons. More precisely, reflective inferences are based on an examination of reasons in order to determine whether they warrant accepting or rejecting a given conclusionthey are thus a special type of metarepresentational mechanism (Mercier & Sperber, 2009;Sperber, 2000). For instance, when we ponder about the pros and cons of a given decision or conclusion, we are using reflective inferences: once our mind is set, we can give an explicit and accurate account of the reasons that have led us to this decision or conclusion.…”

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

“…The other traits associated with different types of processing are probably best seen as common correlates, rather than necessary criteria. Although my characterization of Type 1 and Type 2 processes diverges in some ways from the work of others (e.g., Mercier & Sperber 2009;2011), i believe that for the most part, it would be relatively easy to translate my proposal into forms that are more amenable to alternative interpretations of the two kinds of processes.…”

“…Cf. Mercier and Sperber (2009;2011). and occasionally intervening when needed (e.g., evans & Stanovitch 2013; Kahneman 2011).…”

Evidentials, genre and epistemic vigilance

“…2010:374-376), there are cases where these processes do not suffice and the audience is not prepared to accept the communicated ideas on trust. In a series of papers, Dan Sperber and his associates have argued that these cases are evaluated in a mental module dedicated to evaluating arguments (Sperber 2000(Sperber , 2001Mercier and Sperber 2009;Sperber et al 2010). This module takes claims as inputs and delivers representations of arguments for accepting these claims as output.…”