The Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail: The Public Debate and Perception of Environmental Risk in Susa Valley, Italy

Abstract

When the construction of the Lyon-Turin segment of the new European high-speed rail network was first publicly announced at the beginning of the 1990 s, it immediately found fierce opposition from the inhabitants of Susa Valley, Italy, one of the areas to be cut across by such infrastructure. At issue were the project's potential environmental impact and its consequences on public health. This study intends to clarify environmental risk perception and public debate between the national government, local advocacy groups, and the inhabitants of Susa Valley. Two major phases of public reaction were identified: (1) an initial rebellious period of no real dialog among the project's major stakeholders (exemplified by the popular "No TAV" [No High Speed Train] movement), followed by (2) a yielding period of intense multilateral negotiations centered on the activities of the "Lyon-Turin Environmental Observatory." The results of a qualitative cross analysis of the residents' perception of the proposed high-speed rail revealed that public acceptance of risk in Susa Valley was influenced by the characteristics of hazards perceived by the residents and by the communicative approach used by the project's various stakeholders. It also emerged that early dialog among all the parties involved was critical in forming a personal viewpoint on risk, which, once consolidated, defied new information and perspectives. Likely, a greater and earlier care taken by the other stakeholders to inform and consult the local population about the railway would have greatly eased the public debate.

Environmental risks of high-speed railway in China: Public participation, perception and trust

“…Related to these concerns is the likely devaluation of property, except for property near railway stations. In many countries a majority of local citizens along a (planned) track protested against the planned high-speed railway, while a minority considered the regional economic and social benefits more important than these negative environmental and social risks (Schaap, 1996;Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009;Fedi et al, 2012). Local concerns and anxieties were often paralleled by distrust against (national) planners and decisionmakers, construction and railway companies, and even democratic representative institutions (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009;Lastrico, 2012).…”

“…In many countries a majority of local citizens along a (planned) track protested against the planned high-speed railway, while a minority considered the regional economic and social benefits more important than these negative environmental and social risks (Schaap, 1996;Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009;Fedi et al, 2012). Local concerns and anxieties were often paralleled by distrust against (national) planners and decisionmakers, construction and railway companies, and even democratic representative institutions (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009;Lastrico, 2012). Concerns and distrust around high-speed railway plans turned into widespread and massive protests against such infrastructural protests when public opinion was supportive, residents had a strong attachment to their local places, and local community along the track became involved (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009).…”

“…Local concerns and anxieties were often paralleled by distrust against (national) planners and decisionmakers, construction and railway companies, and even democratic representative institutions (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009;Lastrico, 2012). Concerns and distrust around high-speed railway plans turned into widespread and massive protests against such infrastructural protests when public opinion was supportive, residents had a strong attachment to their local places, and local community along the track became involved (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009).…”

“…Over the past decade governmental authorities in many countries have learned and partly implemented lessons on how to cope, handle and partly prevent these concerns, protests and distrust of local citizens and communities during the planning, implementation and operation of high-speed railways. Hence, we have seen extensive information provisioning from multiple authorities and also disinterested/independent parties and stakeholders; extensive public consultations (De Carlo, 2006;Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009); systematic and institutionalized involvement of citizens, communities and NGOs in different phases of high-speed railway project planning and implementation; growing experiences with and institutionalisation of environmental dispute resolution; and the development of alternative trajectories and costly adaptations of plans e.g. in the form of tunnels, noise screens and compensation funds.…”

Corporate Public Diplomacy and Global Communication of China's “Belt and Road” Initiative

“…However, implementing infrastructure projects, exploiting raw materials, building oil pipelines, or shipping materials might have environmental consequences, which could be another concern of the locals regarding China's BRI; since the poor performance of corporate governance of Chinese transnational corporations in the construction, material, and energy sectors has brought about environmental degradation in host countries, 104 Western countries are more concerned with the environmental impacts and public health risks connected with the construction and operation of HSR. 105 In 2015, China signed a $5.5bn contract with Indonesia to build its first HSR linka 142-km line between Jakarta and Bandungbut it failed to see lift-off until early 2017 as local authorities and the Chinese HSR corporation were not able to coordinate certain tasks, such as land acquisition. 106 Although these problems need to carefully design and implement HSR projects, corporate public diplomacy will help the locals to better understand the environmental, economic, and even legal impacts of these projects built by the Chinese corporations.…”