The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons

Fihn, Beatrice

doi:10.1080/00396338.2017.1282671

Cited by 25 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Hence, a large proportion of the participants in a regime which supposedly reflect the global norms (Tannenwald, 2013) are not heard. If commentators complain that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is not serving the interests of its members (Fihn, 2017; Sauer, 2016), it may be because some of the members are not adequately represented. Looking at the attendance data from the NPT RevCons, it becomes obvious that countries with nuclear programmes and past military activities are more present at the negotiations, and it is not surprising that their preferences get more readily advanced.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy

Onderčo

2019

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very small ones? This article looks at both the causes of variation in state delegations to multilateral conferences but also at the consequences of such variation at both micro-and macrolevel. It tests the arguments derived from liberal theory of international regimes, using the case of the NPT Review Process. The results suggest that economic and security interests drive states' participation in the multilateral settings; normative concerns about global public goods matter less. The article also argues that while countries which are more abundantly present in the negotiations do not tend to get more from international organisations; countries which have been less present during the negotiations tended to be more interested in alternative forum shopping in the form of 'nuclear ban treaty' negotiations.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy

Onderčo

2019

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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“…Of course, the recent success of the humanitarian campaign for an agreement to ban nuclear weapons might suggest a shift in HAC towards a more effective merging of humanitarianism and anti-militarism. Even here, however, it is notable that campaigners have attempted to retain the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate weapons, and the distinction between disarmament as an overarching goal and strategy and disarmament as a weapons-specific tactic (Fihn, 2017;UNIDIR, 2017, 10). Moreover, it is notable that the nuclear weapons states have neither signed up to the ban treaty nor abandoned expensive nuclear modernization programmes (Korb, 2017).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Race, Sovereignty, and Free Trade: Arms Trade Regulation and Humanitarian Arms Control in the Age of Empire

Cooper

2018

Journal of Global Security Studies

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This paper examines arms trade regulation in the late 19 th century and contributes to the literature on norms, arms regulation, humanitarian arms control and arms control as governmentality. I begin by examining the 1890 Brussels Act as an example of the first 'Matryoshka doll' of arms trade governance, a specific humanitarian initiative focused on regulating a particular class of weapons in a specified area. I suggest the Act represented an attempt to graft a regulatory arms trade norm onto an established anti-slavery norm and that it was more extensively implemented than has been recognised. I then locate the Act within the second Matryoshka doll of arms trade governance, the broader approach to prohibition operating in the era. In contrast to representations of the period as one of free trade in arms I demonstrate the extensive efforts to restrict the transfer of firearms to colonial subjects. Finally, I demonstrate how mechanisms of prohibition and permission constituted the practices of arms control as governmentalitythe third matryoshka doll-where the concern was to define and manage which gradations of people could legitimately own, trade and use which gradations of weapons in what contexts. Overall, the paper challenges the optimistic assumptions in much of the literature on humanitarian arms control and arms trade norms. Instead, I suggest the merger of humanitarianism and arms control can reflect the influence of both good and bad norms; is not necessarily incompatible with colonialism, racism or imperial violence and can be congruent with liberal militarism.

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“…However, there is a risk that discussions about these provisions drown out the equally -if not more -important discussions about the TPNW's impact on the longstanding international norm against use of nuclear weapons. While long-standing frustrations with the nuclear-armed States' failure to implement their disarmament obligations and commitments were undoubtedly one of the conditions that made the TPNW possible, the process to negotiate and adopt the Treaty was triggered more directly by a growing recognition of the unacceptable suffering and devastation caused by their use (Fihn 2017).…”

Section: Tpnw As a Means To Prevent Nuclear Usementioning

confidence: 99%

The Future of the Nuclear Taboo: Framing the Impact of the TPNW

Løvold

2021

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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How might the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) help prevent the use of nuclear weapons? Since the adoption of the TPNW in 2017, much has been said about the Treaty's impact on nuclear disarmament. Less has been said about how the Treaty's international humanitarian law (IHL)-based prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons may be best leveraged to further strengthen the long-standing norm against such use. This article explores how the design of the first meeting of States Parties to the TPNW may help ensure respect for the Treaty's prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

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The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy

Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy

Race, Sovereignty, and Free Trade: Arms Trade Regulation and Humanitarian Arms Control in the Age of Empire

The Future of the Nuclear Taboo: Framing the Impact of the TPNW

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