Variation in delegation size in multilateral diplomacy

Abstract

Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very small ones? This article looks at both the causes of variation in state delegations to multilateral conferences but also at the consequences of such variation at both micro-and macrolevel. It tests the arguments derived from liberal theory of international regimes, using the case of the NPT Review Process. The results suggest that economic and security interests drive states' participation in the multilateral settings; normative concerns about global public goods matter less. The article also argues that while countries which are more abundantly present in the negotiations do not tend to get more from international organisations; countries which have been less present during the negotiations tended to be more interested in alternative forum shopping in the form of 'nuclear ban treaty' negotiations.

Who cares about the UN General Assembly? National delegations size from 1993 to 2016

“…Their findings show a generally growing trend in the total number of delegates. Moreover, the studies investigate the cross‐country variation in the delegation size, highlighting the impact of issue‐specific motivations (Kaya & Schofield, 2020; Onderco, 2019). However, the UN remains relatively understudied due to its general‐purpose nature (Lenz et al, 2014).…”

“…Again, countries that control significant financial capacities are more active in negotiations (Panke, 2017a), place more nationals in the international bureaucracies (Novosad & Werker, 2019; Parizek, 2017; Parizek & Stephen, 2021), and provide financial aid to other member states in exchange for their support in the decision‐making (Dreher et al, 2008). Wealthier states also delegate more national representatives to multilateral meetings than countries with fewer financial capacities (Kaya & Schofield, 2020; Onderco, 2019; Vlcek, 2021). Therefore, we may expect that countries with more financial capacities delegate more national representatives to the UNGA sessions than countries with fewer financial resources (H1b).…”

“…The only exception, and maybe the very first analysis dealing with this issue, was published in the late 1960s (Keohane, 1969). Recent research on delegations pays more attention to issue‐specific regimes dealing with climate change (Kaya & Schofield, 2020; Neeff, 2013; Schroeder et al, 2012; Skovgaard & Gallant, 2015) or non‐proliferation (Onderco, 2019).…”

“…I draw on existing findings and identify a set of general country characteristics. Next, I draw on similar studies dealing with issue‐specific regimes (Kaya & Schofield, 2020; Onderco, 2019) and argue that agenda‐related motivations drive up the delegation size even in the general‐purpose environment of the UN.…”

“…Because of the panel nature of the dataset and the count nature of the dependent variable, I use mixed‐effects Poisson models with random country effects and fixed year effects. Similar models were used by Onderco (2019) and Kaya and Schofield (2020). For robustness purposes, I present several additional models in Appendix S1.…”