The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure

McCubbins, Mathew D.

doi:10.2307/2111178

Cited by 345 publications

(140 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The 'congressional dominance' literature showed however that Congress was actually able to exert control over the bureaucracy, both ex post and ex ante. Ex post control occurred through the appropriation process, legislation and legislative changes, and oversight hearings (Weingast and Moran 1983;Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) and ex ante controls were found in agency design, administrative procedures, audits and compulsory reporting (McCubbins 1985;McCubbins et al 1987). The debate revolved around the question whether Congress should apply a "police patrol" or "fire alarms" approach, i.e.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy

2008

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The establishment of autonomous public bodies during the past two decades has created a highly fragmented public sector. Using a dataset with more than 200 Dutch public sector organisations, this article examines three related sets of questions: to what extent a relationship exists between formal and de facto autonomy; the level of influence that interested parties exert upon those organizations; whether a relationship exists between levels of formal and de facto autonomy and the level of influence exercised by these parties. We find that formal autonomy does not reinforce de facto autonomy; organizations with less autonomy report higher levels of political influence when policy autonomy is concerned; and that organizations with more autonomy report higher societal influence on their financial autonomy.

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confidence: 99%

Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy

2008

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“…yields surprising results for the question of bureaucratic control. To see this, we follow Fiorina (1985) and McCubbins (1985) and ask, How do politicians decide which agencies to create? The comparative statics result noted above suggests one answer.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information

Banks¹,

Weingast²

1992

American Journal of Political Science

198

118

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“…to fill in the details when contingencies that have not been included in the constitution occur. Note here the resemblance with Williamson [1975Williamson [ , 1985's and Grossman and Hart [1986]'s seminal work on vertical integration. Grossman and Hart define authority as the residual rights of control conferred by ownership; that is, one of the parties to a transaction is given power to impose decisions in states of nature not specified in their original contract.…”

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confidence: 64%

“…See McCubbins [1985] for a discussion of constraints on bureaucratic decision-making. Lewis and Sappington [1988] analyze the choice among a few commitment possibilities when regulators change over time and internalize consumer welfare during their tenure as regulators only.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions

Laffont¹,

Tirole

1990

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

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RECEIVEDThis idea is illustrated in the context of the regulation of a natural monopoly. Much of the theoretical literature has assumed that a benevolent regulator is prohibited from operating transfers to the firm and maximizes social welfare subject to the firm's budget constraint. The tension between the assumptions of benevolence and of restrictions on instruments in such models leads us to investigate the role played by the mistrust of regulators in the development of this institution. We compare two mandates: average cost pricing (associated with the possibility of transfers). The regulator may identify with the industry, but a regulatory hearing offers the advocacy groups (watchdogs) an opportunity to alter the proposed rule making. The comparison between the two mandates hinges on the dead-weight loss associated with collusion and on the effectiveness of watchdog supervision.

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The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure

Cited by 345 publications

References 35 publications

Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy

Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy

The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information

The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions

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