A major issue in the study of American politicsis the extent to which electoral discipline also constrainsbureaucrats. Inpractice.executive agenciesoperate with considerable independence from elected of cials. However,the entire process of policy execution isa game among legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucraticagents. Itincludes the initialdelegation of authority. the choice of policy alternatives,and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.initssimplest form, the model predicts a world in which bureaucrats are the sole active participants inpolicyrnaking, but inwhich the choice of policy is traceable entirely to the preferencesof elected of cials. More realistically. the model leads to a precise de nition of agency discretion. These conclusions have practical applications for both students and reformers of policymalting.Democratic constitutions attempt to constrain policymakers with the discipline of the electoral process. By mandating frequent elections, the U.S. Constitutiongives representatives (inthe words of The Federalist, no. 52} "an immediatedependence on,and an intimatesympathy with, the people" (Hamilton,Jay, andMadison, 1966,p. 165).Modernresearchhasconrmed the success of this mechanism, mediatedthough itisbythedynamics of interest group organization (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978). Policy decisions, however, are no longer the exclusive domain of elected representatives. A major unresolved issue inthe study of American politics is the extent to whichtheconstitutionalsystemof safeguards andincentivesdesigned to discipline elected representatives also works to discipline bureaucrats.According to one view, the bureaucracy operates with considerable independence from elected representatives. Legislatorsare unable or unwilling to perform meaningful oversight (Nisltanen, 1971; Dodd and Schott, 1929, pp. 170-84; Katzmann, 1980, pp. 140-60), and the president, although perhaps effective on a few selected issues, faces severe constraints of power and resources in controlling his nominal subordinates (Neustadt,