Many if not most markets with network externalities are two‐sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board.” Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper builds a model of platform competition with two‐sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end‐user surplus for different governance structures (profit‐maximizing platforms and not‐for‐profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner. (JEL: L5, L82, L86, L96)
We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment, interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of monitoring will depend on relative changes in the various components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the lending patterns observed during the recent financial crises.
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.Keywords: altruism, rewards, motivation, esteem, crowding out, overjustification effect, identity, social norms, morals, greed, psychology JEL Classification: D64, D82, H41, Z13. People commonly engage in activities that are costly to themselves and mostly benefit others. They volunteer, help strangers, vote, give to political or charitable organizations, donate blood, join rescue squads, or even sacrifice their life for strangers. In experiments, many subjects also display altruistic or reciprocal behaviors. At the same time, a number of important phenomena and puzzles cannot be explained by the sole presence of individuals with other-regarding preferences. What is therefore the broader set of motives that shape people's social conduct, and do how these interact with each other and the economic environment? Contact InformationA first puzzle is that providing rewards and punishments to foster prosocial behavior sometimes has a perverse effect, reducing the total contribution provided by agents. Such a crowding-out of "intrinsic motivation" by extrinsic incentives has been observed in a broad variety of social interactions (see Bruno
We provide a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on two‐sided markets and present new results. We identify two‐sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms, matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two‐sidedness. We build a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtain new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end‐users.
A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine "intrinsic motivation". We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run, and negative reinforcers in the long run. We also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.
There has been a recent surge of interest in open source software development, which involves developers at many di¡erent locations and organizations sharing code to develop and re¢ne programs. To an economist, the behavior of individual programmers and commercial companies engaged in open source projects is initially startling. This paper makes a preliminary exploration of the economics of open source software. We highlight the extent to which labor economics, especially the literature on`career concerns', and industrial organization theory can explain many of these projects' features. We conclude by listing interesting research questions related to open source software.
Society's demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as alternative responses to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We draw on recent developments in the psychology and economics of prosocial behaviour to shed light on this trend and the underlying mix of motivations. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: firms' adoption of a more long-term perspective, the delegated exercise of prosocial behaviour on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. We discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behaviour as a means to further societal goals.
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