The International Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War

Abstract

In combining the domestic and international levels, I contend that the international environment can enable a domestic win-set and thereby guide the formation of a state's international security strategy. The trigger is the nature of and changes in the extant international setting. Based on findings from framing effects and prospect theory, I contend that periods of external crisis, conflict, and war will shift the public's domain to one of relative losses. In this realm, it will be easier for foreign policy advisors who favor offensive security strategies to frame the national debate. Periods of international peace, tranquility, and prosperity will shift the public's domain to relative gains, which will make it easier for advisors who favor risk averse and defensive strategies to frame the national discussion. The outcome can be a more offensive or defensive strategy than the state would have otherwise pursued. I apply the model to Britain to examine Britain's decision to adopt a Limited Liability strategy between 1912 and 1914, and to escalate to a Continental Commitment by 1916 There has been a coherent movement to bring domestic politics "back-in" in security studies and international relations theory. 1 Within this literature, a number of authors have examined the construction of minimum, winning,

When risky decisions are not surprising: An application of prospect theory to the Israeli war decision in 2006

“…When observers and scholars analyze a decision point, the domain of operation is often evaluated strategically, and a judgment is often made about the future prospects of the nation-state concerned as a result of the specific action/inaction (Lobell, 2006). Then, the domain of operation is also considered from the domestic point of view.…”

“…Framing can describe the status quo as the most or least attractive option and therefore has a major impact on the domain of operation (Mckeown, 1992). However, even when advisors and other domestic actors attempt to frame a problem and its possible options in a certain way, it is likely that a ‘framing war’ by all sides, which would cancel opposing biases, would be witnessed and thus the decision-makers would again operate in a rational choice environment, albeit an extreme one (Lobell, 2006: 33).…”

Prospect Theory and Civil–Military Conflict

“…Thus, by understanding how the fear of loss can encourage risk taking, it is possible to glean important insights into why leaders make specific decisions. Notably, Steven Lobell (2006) uses the shift from a realm of gains during a period of international peace to one of losses amidst international conflict to explain the shift to a more aggressive British foreign policy at the onset of World War I. Likewise, Rose McDermott (1992) has used prospect theory to illustrate the thinking of the President Carter during the Iran Hostage Crisis.…”