2010
DOI: 10.1177/1354066109344008
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The heuristic application of explanatory theories in International Relations

Abstract: Explanatory theorists increasingly insist that their theories are useful even though they cannot be deductively applied. But if so, then how do such theories contribute to our understanding of international relations? I argue that explanatory theories are typically heuristically applied: theorists’ accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories’ thematic content, but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations or covering laws. These accounts therefore gain no weight from their … Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Rather, each theory functions as a heuristic resource: it helps to delineate particular problems or questions, provides a conceptual vocabulary with which to investigate specific instances of those problems, and orients the resulting inquiry towards certain mechanisms, actors, and background conditions (see Humphreys 2011). In the absence of causal generalizations, it is the choice of subject matter and of conceptual vocabulary that carries much of the explanatory weight.…”
Section: Theory As a Heuristic Resourcementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rather, each theory functions as a heuristic resource: it helps to delineate particular problems or questions, provides a conceptual vocabulary with which to investigate specific instances of those problems, and orients the resulting inquiry towards certain mechanisms, actors, and background conditions (see Humphreys 2011). In the absence of causal generalizations, it is the choice of subject matter and of conceptual vocabulary that carries much of the explanatory weight.…”
Section: Theory As a Heuristic Resourcementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus we often call theory a 'framework'. While some are satisfied with the heuristic function and relegate the discovery of causes to empirical research (Humphreys 2011), most scholars expect theory to provide not This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Sage in European Journal of International Relations: http://journals.sagepub.com/loi/ejta Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: 5 just concepts but to connect them into explanations and arguments, "statements of what may roughly be called a causal nature" (Sabine, 1969(Sabine, [1931: 12). In other words, theory has an explanatory function; it helps us understand how and why things happen.…”
Section: Re-approaching Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, we often call theory a ‘framework’. While some are satisfied with the heuristic function and relegate the discovery of causes to empirical research (Humphreys, 2011), most scholars expect theory not just to provide concepts, but to connect them into explanations and arguments, ‘statements of what may roughly be called a causal nature’ (Sabine, 1969 [1939]: 12). In other words, theory has an explanatory function; it helps us understand how and why things happen.…”
Section: Re-approaching Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the hands of Hollis and Smith (1990), explanation is that kind of social science story that looks in from outside and attempts to unify phenomena under some regularity, usually lawlike. Despite their caution that this is only ever half the story, explanation is still generally advocated or opposed in terms of a specific variant embodied by positivism, neo-positivism and mathematically enthralled programmes of overt hyper-rationalism (for enlightening discussions, see Humphreys, 2011; Jackson, 2010: 63–69).…”
Section: War Rape In the Feminist Imaginarymentioning
confidence: 99%