This paper starts from the observation that, at a time when the popularity of grand theory is in decline among IR scholars, they do not agree on what they mean by theory. In fact, the celebration of theoretical pluralism is accompanied by the relative absence of a serious conversation about what 'theory' is, could, or should be. Taking the view that we need such a conversation, this puts forward the notion of 'deep theorizing'. Countering both the shallow theorizing of modern scholarship that conflates theory with scientific method, and the postmodern view that abstract narratives must be deconstructed and rejected, it offers a reading of the parameters along which substantial theorizing proceeds. Specifically, it suggests that 'deep theorizing' is the conceptual effort of explaining (inter)action by developing a reading of drives/basic motivations and the ontology of its carrier through an account of the human condition, that is, a particular account of how the subject (the political actor) is positioned in social space and time. The paper illustrates the plausibility of this metatheoretical angle in a discussion of realist, liberal and postcolonial schools of thought. This article explores practices of theorizing world politics to put forward a reading of what is called 'deep theorizing'. It starts from two observations. The first is that scholars of International Relations (IR) do not agree on what they mean by 'theory'. More than three decades after James Rosenau noted that "much of the writing [in the field] suffers from loose and ambiguous conceptions of theory" (Rosenau 1980), the editors of EJIR stated "there remains no agreement on what constitutes proper theory in IR" (Dunne et al. 2013: 14; also Burchill, 2001: 8). Instead, we are presented with different kinds and types of theories attesting pluralism not only in the sense of having an ever-growing number of theories but in the very meaning of theory (Zalewski 1996; Jorgensen 2010; Dunne et al. 2013). The second observation is that the proliferation of 'theories' goes hand in hand with the perceived decline of established 'isms'. If there is a consensus among IR scholars it seems to be dismissing 'grand theory' as suitable frameworks for generating meaningful insights and conversations This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Sage in European

This article scrutinizes two concepts central to the ontological security framework, agency and anxiety. Its point of departure is the view that conceptions of agency are expressed in the attempt to become ontologically secure, which requires a more careful look at how humans try to satisfy the need for a ‘stable sense of Self’ by putting in place ‘anxiety controlling mechanisms’. This, in turn, raises the question what these mechanisms are supposed to control, which shifts attention to the concept of ‘anxiety’. Going back to Kierkegaard's original treatment and Heidegger's existential phenomenology, the article reviews the emergence of anxiety as a core feature of the human condition and highlights what it calls the ‘anxiety paradox’: the tendency of reflexive humans facing the freedom of being in time to attach themselves to constructs that provide a sense of temporal continuity, or certainty. The article argues that the existing ontological security literature is trapped in this paradox and therefore cannot account for radical forms of agency.

This article revisits and revives the concept of ‘the Stranger’ in theorising international relations by discussing how this figure appears and what role it plays in the politics of (collective) identity. It shows that this concept is central to poststructuralist logic discussing the political production of discourses of danger and to scholarship on ontological security but remains subdued in their analytical narratives. Making the concept of the Stranger explicit is important, we argue, because it directs attention to ambivalence as a source of anxiety and grasps the unsettling experiences that political strategies of conquest or conversion, including practices of securitisation, respond to. Against this backdrop, the article provides a nuanced reading of the Stanger as a form of otherness that captures ambiguity as a threat to modern conceptions of identity, and outlines three scenarios of how it may be encountered in interstate relations: the phenomenon of ‘rising powers’ from the perspective of the hegemon, the dissolution of enmity (overcoming an antagonistic relationship), and the dissolution of friendship (close allies drifting apart). Aware that recovering the concept is not simply an academic exercise but may feed into how the term is used in political discourse and how practitioners deal with ‘strange encounters’, we conclude by pointing to alternative readings of the Stranger/strangeness and the value of doing so.

The relationship between 'Germany' and 'power' remains a sensitive issue. While observers tend to agree that Germany has regained the status of the most powerful country in Europe, there is debate whether that is to be welcomed or whether that is a problem. Underpinning this debate are views, both within Germany and amongst its neighbours, regarding the kind of power Germany has, or should (not) have. Against this backdrop, the article reviews the dominant role conceptions used in the expert discourse on German foreign policy since the Cold War that depict Germany as a particular type of 'power'. Specifically, we sketch the evolution of three prominent conceptions (constrained power, civilian power, hegemonic power) and the recent emergence of a new one (shaping power). The article discusses how these labels have emerged to give meaning to Germany's position in international relations, points to their normative and political function, and to the limited ability of such role images to tell us much about how Germany actually exercises power.

This article scrutinizes the assumption that friends support each other in times of war. Picking up the notion that solidarity, or ‘other-help’, is a key feature of friendship between states, the article explores how states behave when a friend is attacked by an overwhelming enemy. It directs attention to the trade-off between solidarity and self-help that governments face in such a situation and makes the novel argument that the decision about whether and how to support the friend is significantly influenced by assessments of the distribution of material capabilities and the relationship the state has with the aggressor. This proposition is supported empirically in an examination of Sweden’s response to its Nordic friends’ need for help during the Second World War – to Finland during the 1939–1940 ‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union, and to Norway following the invasion of Germany from 1940 to 1945.

The relationship between 'Germany' and 'power' remains a sensitive issue. While observers tend to agree that Germany has regained the status of the most powerful country in Europe, there is debate whether that is to be welcomed or whether that is a problem. Underpinning this debate are views, both within Germany and amongst its neighbours, regarding the kind of power Germany has, or should (not) have. Against this backdrop, the article reviews the dominant role conceptions used in the expert discourse on German foreign policy since the Cold War that depict Germany as a particular type of 'power'. Specifically, we sketch the evolution of three prominent conceptions (constrained power, civilian power, hegemonic power) and the recent emergence of a new one (shaping power). The article discusses how these labels have emerged to give meaning to Germany's position in international relations, points to their normative and political function, and to the limited ability of such role images to tell us much about how Germany actually exercises power.

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