The generality of the emotion effect on magnitude sensitivity

Abstract

Two studies asked whether reported emotional response interfere with magnitude sensitivity, defined as a subjective evaluation difference between a high magnitude outcome and a low one. Previous research has reported that emotion reduces magnitude sensitivity under separate evaluation in a gain domain (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004), a negative effect. We test the generality of this emotion effect in gain and loss domains, and under separate or joint evaluation mode, using a variety of stimuli. We found an opposite, positive, effect in Experiment 1 (willingness to pay to save species or prevent health impairments) but replicated the original negative effect in Experiment 2 (compensation for losses). Further research is needed to disentangle possible causes of these effects and to explore how these findings may be applied to measurement of values for non-market goods.

Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy.

“…When faced with large numbers that are difficult to mentally represent, people may sometimes imagine a representative and more vivid prototype that keeps their emotions engaged (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). While some evidence exists that affect-rich stimuli tend to decrease scope sensitivity (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; but see Gong & Baron, 2011), in the context of lifesaving it might be useful to enhance affective processing. Emotions based on moral intuitions can be a good guide in valuations when only few lives are at risk, and if these intuitions do not scale up well other steps need to be taken to keep emotions aroused when many lives are at risk (Slovic et al, 2013).…”