2012
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0137-4
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Valuations of human lives: normative expectations and psychological mechanisms of (ir)rationality

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Cited by 32 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…At a theoretical level, these results suggest that important descriptive decision-making accounts such as prospect theory may not always adequately describe how people value human lives [4], [5]. We propose that, for life-saving decisions, both the gain (Studies 1–3) and loss domain (Study 4) of the value function may not only be characterized by a decreased sensitivity as magnitude increases (the psychophysical function in Figure 1), but may sometimes even show a decline in value (Figure 5).…”
Section: General Discussion and Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…At a theoretical level, these results suggest that important descriptive decision-making accounts such as prospect theory may not always adequately describe how people value human lives [4], [5]. We propose that, for life-saving decisions, both the gain (Studies 1–3) and loss domain (Study 4) of the value function may not only be characterized by a decreased sensitivity as magnitude increases (the psychophysical function in Figure 1), but may sometimes even show a decline in value (Figure 5).…”
Section: General Discussion and Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Studies of people's moral intuitions about these cases suggest that people feel morally obligated to help others in dire need (and/or disparage others who do not help) when the victim's needs are salient to the agent and the agent can help effectively (Nagel & Waldmann, 2013), and when others are in-group members (Baron & Miller, 2001). However, people feel less morally obligated to help (and judge not helping as less wrong) when they focus on the number or proportion of individuals they cannot help rather than focus on the individuals that they can help, a phenomenon dubbed "futility thinking" (Bartels & Burnett, 2010;Unger, 1996) or "pseudoinefficacy" (Dickert et al, 2012). Interestingly, strict utilitarians may be less susceptible to futility thinking than people with more flexible moral systems.…”
Section: Moral Obligation To Helpmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Axiom of Monotonicity is also assumed to hold for the value of human lives: Saving more lives is better than saving less lives (e.g., Shenhav & Green, 2010;Slovic, 2007;Slovic, Zionts, Woods, Goodman, & Jinks, 2013). Slovic (2007) and others (e.g., Dickert, Västfjäll, Kleber, & Slovic, 2012;Tverskey & Kahneman, 1992;Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen 2001) accept the Axiom of Monotonicity with regards to saving a human life. Slovic (2007), for example, proposed that the value of saving a human life is a monotonically increasing logarithmic function of the number of lives saved (e.g., Dickert et al, 2012;Stevens, 1975).…”
Section: The Psychological Value Of Human Livesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Slovic (2007) and others (e.g., Dickert, Västfjäll, Kleber, & Slovic, 2012;Tverskey & Kahneman, 1992;Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen 2001) accept the Axiom of Monotonicity with regards to saving a human life. Slovic (2007), for example, proposed that the value of saving a human life is a monotonically increasing logarithmic function of the number of lives saved (e.g., Dickert et al, 2012;Stevens, 1975). The biggest influence of the number of lives saved on behavior occurs when a small number of lives are saved.…”
Section: The Psychological Value Of Human Livesmentioning
confidence: 99%