The Function of Normative Process-Requirements

Fink, Julian

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01292.x

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The Broomean view of requirements has another advantage. It is also able to respond to an objection raised by Fink (2012Fink ( , 2014 against what he calls the 'necessary conditions account of normative requirements'. This objection concerns the kinds of things that may properly be subject to normative requirements.…”

Section: Sources Reasons and Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 91%

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Sources, reasons, and requirements

Guindon

2015

Philos Stud

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This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some-but not all-requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view-which I attribute to John Broome-normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view.

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Section: Sources Reasons and Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Fink (2012Fink ( , 2014) raises a similar concern when arguing against the necessary conditions account of normative requirements. I take it that Broome's strategy below in defining a property P that corresponds to a source of requirements S in terms of the source's code addresses this objection, which is partly why I also adopt it.…”

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confidence: 88%

Sources, reasons, and requirements

Guindon

2015

Philos Stud

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A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’

Fink

2014

Erkenn

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The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of 'rationality requires'. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in 'necessary explanations of subjective incoherence', as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence.

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The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Fink

2017

Philos Stud

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Abstract. Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome's work on rational requirements, the answer is 'no' -at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide-with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires -even in cases where we expect a precise answer.

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The Function of Normative Process-Requirements

Cited by 4 publications

References 23 publications

Sources, reasons, and requirements

Sources, reasons, and requirements

A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

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