This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some-but not all-requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view-which I attribute to John Broome-normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view.
Il existe de nombreuses sources d’exigences. Certaines exigences sont normatives dans la mesure où elles impliquent des affirmations concernant ce que nous avons raison de croire, faire, désirer, etc. À ce titre, les exigences morales sont parmi les meilleures candidates. Si la morale exige que l’on tienne notre promesse, il semble que nous avons une raison de la tenir. Cependant, ce ne sont pas toutes les exigences qui sont normatives en ce sens. Le catholicisme exige que l’on assiste à la messe chaque dimanche. Il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant que nous avons une raison d’y assister. Pourquoi cela? Pourquoi certaines exigences sont normatives en ce sens, mais pas d’autres? En vue de répondre à cette question, je défends la conception reasons-sensitive des exigences normatives, selon laquelle les exigences normatives sont celles et seulement celles qui sont sensibles aux raisons. Par contre, cette conception n’est pas la seule disponible. Selon ce que j’appelle la conception reasons-providing, les exigences normatives sont celles et seulement celles qui fournissent des raisons. Je soutiens que cette conception-ci est vulnérable à deux objections, ce qui nous donne raison de préférer la première.There are many different sources of requirements. Some requirements are normative in the sense that they entail claims about what we have reasons to believe, intend, desire, and so on. Moral requirements are among the most plausible candidates. If morality requires that you keep your promises, it seems to follow that there is a reason for you to do so. However, not all requirements are normative in this sense. Catholicism requires that you attend Mass every Sunday. However, it does not follow that there is a reason for you to do so. Why is that? Why are some, but not all, requirements normative in this sense? In the aim of answering this question, I defend the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements, according to which normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to reasons. However, the reasons-sensitive view is not the only account on offer, nor is it the most dominant. According to what I call the reasons-providing view, normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view faces two important objections, which gives us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive vie
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