A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’

Fink, Julian

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9591-8

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…The Broomean view of requirements has another advantage. It is also able to respond to an objection raised by Fink (2012Fink ( , 2014 against what he calls the 'necessary conditions account of normative requirements'. This objection concerns the kinds of things that may properly be subject to normative requirements.…”

Section: Sources Reasons and Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Sources, reasons, and requirements

Guindon

2015

Philos Stud

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This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some-but not all-requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view-which I attribute to John Broome-normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view.

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Section: Sources Reasons and Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Fink (2012Fink ( , 2014) raises a similar concern when arguing against the necessary conditions account of normative requirements. I take it that Broome's strategy below in defining a property P that corresponds to a source of requirements S in terms of the source's code addresses this objection, which is partly why I also adopt it.…”

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confidence: 99%

Sources, reasons, and requirements

Guindon

2015

Philos Stud

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“…Simpler examples of requirements of rationality include a requirement for not having contradictory beliefs and a requirement for not having intransitive preferences. Much of the work on structural rationality is dedicated to making such requirements explicit (see Fink 2014).…”

Section: Structural Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification

Beck

2022

Economics and Philosophy

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Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational agents. Afterward, I address two pressing challenges against preference purification that emerge under the structural rationality account.

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The Ladder of Rationality

Fink

2015

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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A Constitutive Account of ‘Rationality Requires’

Cited by 5 publications

References 22 publications

Sources, reasons, and requirements

Sources, reasons, and requirements

The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification

The Ladder of Rationality

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