The externalist and the amoralist

Lenman, James

doi:10.1007/bf02383189

Cited by 41 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…James Lenman (1999) offers a starting point for thinking about widespread amoralism. He asks us to consider an entire planet of amoralists, Amorality, where we are told scientists ascertain and record moral facts, but where no one is ever practically motivated by their moral judgments (1999, pp.…”

Section: Amorality and Alphamentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism

Bedke

2008

Philos Stud

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Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A's sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to u motivates A to u. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.

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Section: Amorality and Alphamentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism

Bedke

2008

Philos Stud

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“…29 For defences of unconditional internalism, see e.g. Lenman (1999) 30 Unfortunately, it is not always entirely clear whether a certain version of conditional internalism should be classified as strong or weak. However, in strong conditional internalism condition C seems often to be understood as the absence of particular mental conditions, such as addiction, apathy, compulsion, emotional disturbance, etc.…”

Section: Two Versions Of Conditional Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internalism and the frege: Geach problem

Strandberg¹

2019

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something, irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to cognitivist internalism according to which moral judgments consist in motivating beliefs. Hence, in order for a metaethical view to evade the Frege-Geach problem, it should avoid stating that moral judgments are motivating.

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“…Some philosophers have suggested that linguistic communities like this are not deploying ethical concepts (e.g., Lenman 1999 andBedke 2009; for a contrary view see Gert and Mele 2005). The idea of community-level internalism, then, is that, necessarily, there is a community-level connection between ethical judgment and motivation, for any community of speakers that uses words to conventionally voice their ethical judgments.…”

Section: Community-level Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%