The experience of freedom in decisions – Questioning philosophical beliefs in favor of psychological determinants

Lau, Stephan; Hiemisch, Anette; Baumeister, Roy F.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.11.008

Cited by 18 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…That is experienced as a failure of free will. It is perhaps more a judgment on the outcome than the process, however ( Lau, Hiemisch, & Baumeister, 2015 ). That is, people feel lack of freedom when they do not get the result they wanted, rather than based on features of the choice process.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Addiction, cigarette smoking, and voluntary control of action: Do cigarette smokers lose their free will?

Baumeister

2017

Addictive Behaviors Reports

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Opinions differ widely as to whether addicts lose the ability to control their behavior and employ free will. This article reviews empirical findings regarding multiple questions relevant to the issue of free will among addicted smokers: Is smoking voluntary behavior? Can people quit smoking? Why don't people quit smoking? Why do smokers relapse when they try to quit? Do addicted smokers suffer from irresistible cravings? Are there some people who cannot quit? Are there conditions that make resistance impossible? Why would they smoke knowing it can kill them? The evidence reviewed here seems most consistent with the view that smokers retain control over their actions but cannot easily stop having frequent desires to smoke.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Addiction, cigarette smoking, and voluntary control of action: Do cigarette smokers lose their free will?

Baumeister

2017

Addictive Behaviors Reports

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“…For example, our work has revealed a mismatch between philosophical theories about decision freedom and laypersons’ self-reports of decision freedom. Lau et al (2015) reported a series of experiments measuring how free people felt while making various decisions. The experiments manipulated a host of variables that theorists have linked to free action: number and diversity of options, uncertainty about future outcome, competing reasons, (absence of) time pressure, lack of a clear best option, difficulty of deciding, and the like.…”

Section: Free Action and Conscious Thoughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Necessity of Consciousness for Sophisticated Human Action

et al. 2018

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In this essay, we aim to counter and qualify the epiphenomenalist challenge proposed in this special issue on the grounds of empirical and theoretical arguments. The current body of scientific knowledge strongly indicates that conscious thought is a necessary condition for many human behaviors, and therefore, consciousness qualifies as a cause of those behaviors. We review illustrative experimental evidence for the causal power of conscious thought while also acknowledging its natural limitations. We argue that it is implausible that the metabolic costs inherent to conscious processes would have evolved in humans without any adaptive benefits. Moreover, we discuss the relevance of conscious thought to the issue of freedom. Many accounts hold conscious thought as necessary and conducive to naturalistic conceptions of personal freedom. Apart from these theories, we show that the conscious perception of freedom and the belief in free will provide sources of interesting findings, beneficial behavioral effects, and new avenues for research. We close by proposing our own challenge via outlining the gaps that have yet to be filled to establish hard evidence of an epiphenomenal model of consciousness. To be sure, we appreciate the epiphenomenalist challenge as it promotes critical thinking and inspires rigorous research. However, we see no merit in downplaying the causal significance of consciousness a priori. Instead, we believe it more worthwhile to focus on the complex interplay between conscious and other causal processes.

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“…The according subjective representation, which people maintain and retrieve when they assess their freedom, is presumably of positive valence and rather refers to the freedom of action (i.e., doing what one wants) than to functional freedom (i.e., complex choices, conflict, and uncertainty). A recent study has supported this divergence between theoretical and subjective freedom, by showing that ratings of experienced freedom followed an outcome model (i.e., freedom predicted by easy choices and good consequences), but not a process model (i.e., freedom predicted by complex choices and underdetermination) [ 58 ]. This result demonstrated that, as supposed, being free and feeling free may not quite refer to the same conditions [ 58 , 59 ].…”

Section: Hypotheses Benefits and Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given the diverging results already obtained with subjective freedom [ 58 ], the question arises whether people even recognize features of underdetermination (i.e., epistemic openness of choice) in a decision conflict. In a recent study, we tested the hypothesis that with increasing conflict, participants would judge the decision as more open, less predictable, and more self-determined [ 64 ].…”

Section: Hypotheses Benefits and Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Functional Freedom: A Psychological Model of Freedom in Decision-Making

Lau

Hiemisch

2017

Behavioral Sciences

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The freedom of a decision is not yet sufficiently described as a psychological variable. We present a model of functional decision freedom that aims to fill that role. The model conceptualizes functional freedom as a capacity of people that varies depending on certain conditions of a decision episode. It denotes an inner capability to consciously shape complex decisions according to one’s own values and needs. Functional freedom depends on three compensatory dimensions: it is greatest when the decision-maker is highly rational, when the structure of the decision is highly underdetermined, and when the decision process is strongly based on conscious thought and reflection. We outline possible research questions, argue for psychological benefits of functional decision freedom, and explicate the model’s implications on current knowledge and research. In conclusion, we show that functional freedom is a scientific variable, permitting an additional psychological foothold in research on freedom, and that is compatible with a deterministic worldview.

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The experience of freedom in decisions – Questioning philosophical beliefs in favor of psychological determinants

Cited by 18 publications

References 25 publications

Addiction, cigarette smoking, and voluntary control of action: Do cigarette smokers lose their free will?

Addiction, cigarette smoking, and voluntary control of action: Do cigarette smokers lose their free will?

On the Necessity of Consciousness for Sophisticated Human Action

Functional Freedom: A Psychological Model of Freedom in Decision-Making

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