The Executive Revolving Door: New Dataset on the Career Moves of Former Danish Ministers and Permanent Secretaries^☆

Abstract

Concerns have been raised that transfers of bureaucrats and politicians into the private sector might create unfair advantages for their future employers and even lead to distrust in government. Not surprisingly, the study of the revolving door has therefore gained prominence in the academic literature. Importantly, however, less attention has been paid to the executive branch. We add to the study of the revolving door by presenting the first dataset on the executive revolving door in Denmark. To do so, we trace the frequency, timing and character of the career moves of Danish Ministers and Permanent Secretaries who held office from 2009 to 2019. Our data document that the Danish executive revolving door is widespread: more than a third of Danish Ministers and Permanent Secretaries end up in a private job within the same year or the year after they stop their job. If we extend the period and investigate the entire period after public service, the number is above 60 percent. Moreover, a substantial share of the jobs obtained is in companies and at a senior level. Our note concludes with reflections on how our data can be used to fill existing research gaps and should be complemented in future research.☆ We thank the editors and our three anonymous reviewers for the excellent feedback. Data and code are available here: https://datav erse.harva rd.edu/datas et.xhtml ?persi stent Id=doi: 10.7910/DVN/OYW9GF.

Governmental institutionalization of corporate influence on national nutrition policy and health: a case study of Ecuador

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The revolving door in UK government departments: A configurational analysis

“…Political economists have focused a great deal of attention on former politicians and their personal staff taking up corporate jobs (e.g., Egerod, 2022; i Vidal et al, 2012), while public administration scholars have addressed the movement of officials within arms‐length regulatory bodies into private sector jobs (e.g., Law & Long, 2011; Peci et al, 2022). However, beyond descriptive accounts in the general media (e.g., Aaronovitch, 2021), surprisingly little is known about the movement of senior civil servants within government departments into private sector roles with companies that they previously regulated (though see Rasmussen et al, 2021). In particular, systematic investigation of the government departments in which revolving door activity is more or less prevalent has been lacking, despite recent calls for analysis of revolving across multiple policy areas (Chalmers et al, 2022), and wider recognition of the salience of agency/department‐level characteristics for bureaucratic behaviors (Askim et al, 2021; Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990).…”

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The place of political experience in lobbyist careers: Decisive, divergent or diverse?

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