The revolving door in UK government departments: A configurational analysis

Abstract

The “revolving door” between those at the top of public and private organizations has given rise to questions about the “pull” and “push” factors influencing public servants' switching into lucrative posts with companies they previously regulated. In this study, we investigate the departmental attributes associated with the movement of senior British civil servants into potentially controversial corporate jobs. To do so, we develop a configurational analysis of revolving door activity in UK government departments for 2015–2018 using panel‐based fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). We identify a series of alternative departmental conditions' based pathways for taking up, or not taking up, a role in the private sector. In particular, more prestigious departments with high levels of pay and low levels of agencification are associated with revolving door activity, while departments with low levels of pay, high levels of agencification, and low levels of capital procurement tend to be associated with an absence of such activity.