The evaluation of complex social stimuli.

Manis, Melvin; Gleason, Terry C.; Dawes, Robyn M.

doi:10.1037/h0023039

Cited by 64 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(20 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…For the additive model, ^ = skw, for the constant-weight averaging model with initial impression, "% = s-[_kw/(v>o + &«<)]. Manis et al (1966) have suggested a somewhat different model in which set size has an effect proportional to the logarithm of the set size plus 1: ^ = s-\og(k + 1).…”

Section: Discussion : Model Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality judgment: Test of an averaging model with differential weights.

Birnbaum¹

1973

Journal of Experimental Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Ratings of persons described by sets of moral and immoral actions were inconsistent with additive and averaging models of information integration. An averaging model with differential weights could not give a consistent account of the effects of both the number of items and the heterogeneity of the items in the set. Highly immoral deeds appear to have an overriding influence on the overall judgment: Having committed one bad deed, a person will be rated "bad," with his good deeds having little influence. Morality judgment may thus represent a truly configural process.Recent research with judgments of the morality of objectionable behaviors (Birnbaum, 1972a) suggests that 5s integrate evaluations of immorality in a nonadditive fashion. Contrary to additive or constantweight averaging models, judgments of the overall morality of 2 actions depend upon the range of the values within the set, as well as their sum or mean. The greater the range of the items, holding mean scale value constant, the lower the judgment of morality.The interactions obtained by Birnbaum (1972a) were interpreted as consistent with either a range model (Birnbaum, Parducci, & Gifford, 1971) or an averaging model with differential weights (Anderson, 1972;Oden & Anderson, 1971). The differentialweight averaging model could account for 1 Thanks are due to Allen Parducci, Norman H. Anderson, and Dwight Riskey for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to Clairice T. Veit for her assistance with the experimental work and her suggestions on the manuscript. This research was completed while the author held a National Defense Education Act Title IV graduate fellowship at University of California, Los Angeles; this paper was completed while the author held a National Institute of Mental Health postdoctoral fellowship at University of California, San Diego. Computing assistance was received from Campus Computing Network, University of California, Los Angeles. Assistance in the preparation of the manuscript was provided by Center for Human Information Processing through National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH-15828.2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Michael H. Birnbaum, Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, P.O. Box 109, La Jolla, California 92037.the interactions with the assumption that the more immoral items have greater weight.The present study extends the investigation of morality judgment to test the differential-weight averaging model. This is accomplished by using items of both moral and immoral value and by varying the number of items in the set. METHODThe 5s were required to make a rating of the overall morality of performing all of the behaviors described in each set of items. They recorded their ratings, 1 through 9, to represent different verbal categories: 1 = very very bad, 2 = very bad, 3 = bad, 4 = slightly bad, 5 = neutral (neither good nor bad), 6 = slightly good, 7 = good, 8 = very good, and 9 = very very good.Subjects. The 5s were 60 undergraduates at the

show abstract

Section: Discussion : Model Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality judgment: Test of an averaging model with differential weights.

Birnbaum¹

1973

Journal of Experimental Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) have suggested a model in which the weight of an item is proportional to its extremity. Differential weighting has also been considered by Manis, Gleason, and Dawes (1966) and by Feldman (1968). There are many possible explanations for differential weighting models.…”

Section: Theoretical Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality judgments: Tests of an averaging model.

Birnbaum¹

1972

Journal of Experimental Psychology

123

108

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Pairs of items describing objectionable behaviors were rated for their overall morality. Contrary to additive or constant-weight averaging models, the ratings were demonstrated to depend upon the range as well as the average scale value of the component behaviors. A range model accounted for more than half of the variance left unexplained by the additive models. One interpretation of the range effect postulates that each component stimulus produces a distribution of values. The value of the stimulus combination is assumed to be the mean value in the overlap of the component distributions, which is closer to the item with the narrower dispersion.

show abstract

“…The third approach, an averaging model with differential weights, predicts that information is still averaged together but that some of the items of information are weighted more heavily than others. For example, several models suggest that items with more extreme values are weighted more heavily (e.g., Anderson, 1981;Manis, Gleason, & Dawes, 1966;Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955), and others suggest that the weight of any one bit of information depends on the value of any other available information (Anderson, 197 l;Oden & Anderson, 197 1;also see Birnbaum & Stegner, 198 1;Surber, 1977Surber, , 1982.…”

Section: Virginia Commonwealth Universitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual differences in information integration during moral judgment.

Forsyth

1985

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

120

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An ethical ideologies model based on relativism and idealism was tested. Subjects judged the morality of an individual who produced a mildly or extremely positive or negative consequence by conforming to or violating a common moral norm. As predicted, an averaging model with differential weights accounted for situationists' (high relativism and idealism) and absolutists' (low relativism and high idealism) judgments; conformity to norms was discounted when the consequence was extremely negative or positive. In contrast, subjectivists' (high relativism and low idealism) judgments conformed to an averaging model; a mildly positive consequence lowered moral judgments of conforming actions. whereas a mildly negative consequence tended to raise moral judgments of nonconforming actions. Last, exceptionists' (low relativism and idealism) judgments were influenced equally by conformity and consequence. These individuals generally combined data in a strictly linear, additive fashion; the more positive the consequence or the greater the conformity of the action to a moral norm, thc more positive the moral judgment.

show abstract

The evaluation of complex social stimuli.

Cited by 64 publications

References 21 publications

Morality judgment: Test of an averaging model with differential weights.

Morality judgment: Test of an averaging model with differential weights.

Morality judgments: Tests of an averaging model.

Individual differences in information integration during moral judgment.

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About