The Ethics of Belief

Feldman, Richard

doi:10.2307/2653823

Cited by 314 publications

(124 citation statements)

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“…E por que não haveria esse estado? Do ponto de vista da tradição, que trata como evidência aquilo que é percebido sensorialmente pelo indivíduo, considerando a totalidade das suas experiências presentes, razões para suspender a crença de que p, podem ser razões prudenciais que decorrem do estado psicológico de insegurança em que o sujeito se encontra em relação ao mérito prático da evidência (Feldman 2000).…”

Section: O Problema Das Razões Certas E Erradas Novamenteunclassified

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Engel

2017

Veritas

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RESUMO:Neste artigo examino a possibilidade de agência no domínio epistêmico -a visão compartilhada por muitos filósofos de que possamos ser ativos, ao invés de passivos, em relação às nossas crenças e manifestações de conhecimento. Concluo que a noção de agência epistêmica é plausível apenas em sentido indireto, referindose as diferentes ações que realizamos com intuito de melhorar nossos compromissos epistêmicos. Trata-se de um tipo de agência prática, como qualquer agência, mas que não nos autoriza a pensar que possamos estar agindo de alguma maneira quando cremos ou conhecemos. Palavras-chave: Agência; Racionalidade Epistêmica; Racionalidade Prática; Conhecimento. ABSTRACT:In this paper, I examine the possibility of agency in the epistemic domain -the view shared by many philosophers that we can be active, rather than passive, in relation to our beliefs and knowledge. I conclude that the notion of epistemic agency is plausible only in an indirect sense, referring to the different actions we take to improve our epistemic commitments. It is a kind of practical agency, like any agency, which does not allow us to think that we can be acting in any way when we believe or know.

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Section: O Problema Das Razões Certas E Erradas Novamenteunclassified

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Engel

2017

Veritas

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“…Feldman (2000) argues that there are "role--oughts" that apply to anyone who occupies a certain role regardless of how well they are able to play that role -for instance, chefs ought to make delicious food and jugglers ought to keep their balls in the air regardless of whether they are capable of doing so.…”

Section: Rationality and Human Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideal rationality and logical omniscience

Smithies

2015

Synthese

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Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place.This paper defends an account of apriori justification for beliefs about logic that is designed to explain the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience.On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding.The proposal is that logical truths provide sources of apriori justification to believe those truths that is indubitable, infallible, and indefeasible. This account is designed to explain why rationality requires logical omniscience.This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. On this account, experience is not a source of apriori justification for beliefs about logic, although it can enable one to use apriori justification that one already has in forming justified beliefs about logic. Similarly, experience is not a source of evidence that defeats apriori justification for beliefs about logic, although it can disable one from using apriori justification in forming justified beliefs. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role.As I will explain, this account has consequences for a wide range of current issues in epistemology, including the connection between justification and truth, the nature of epistemic idealization, the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, the function of higher--order evidence of one's cognitive imperfection, and the possibility of rational dilemmas.Here is the plan for the paper. Sections 1 & 2 explain and motivate the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience. Section 3 proposes an account of 2 apriori justification for beliefs about logic that explains this rational requirement. Sections 4 & 5 respond to objections by drawing a distinction between ideal andnon--ideal standards of rationality. Sections 6 & 7 develop an account of the enabling and disabling role of experience in the epistemology of logic. Sections 8 & 9 explore the implications of this account for the structure of ideal rationality. Section 10 concludes with a summary of the main claims of the paper. Probabilistic CoherenceA defining feature of probabilistic theories of rationality is the requirement that one's credences, or degrees of confidence, must be probabilistically coherent in the sense that they conform to the axioms of the probability calculus:(1) For every P, pr (P) ≥ 0.(2) If P is a tautology [i.e. a necessary truth], then pr (P) = 1.(3) If P and Q are mutually exc...

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“…In order to accommodate the intuition that an ought might still commit one although the agent may not be in position to do the relevant actions, Richard Feldman's (2000Feldman's ( , 2007 has proposed that the oughts which regulate beliefs are not such that an agent is supposed to do something, intentionally or voluntarily, but such that the agent has to fill a certain role. On this view, just as it is the role of a teacher to be competent and to grade appropriately his students' work, it is the role of a believer to form beliefs according to certain prescriptions, in particular the prescription to believe on the basis of the evidence that one has.…”

Section: Compatibilism About Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance the evidentialist norm that one ought to believe what is justified by one's evidence ( Feldman 2000( Feldman , 2008 depends upon this norm. But the norm itself is one thing, and the way it is regulated is another thing.…”

Section: Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Engel

2009

Philosophical Explorations

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This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various "Kantian" views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility, in particular the one proposed by Pamela Hieronymi (2007). I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents

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The Ethics of Belief

Cited by 314 publications

References 0 publications

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

Ideal rationality and logical omniscience

Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

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