The Ethics of Argumentation

Abstract

Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of debates. Yet empirical research on human inference shows that people systematically fall prey to cognitive and motivational biases which give rise to various forms of irrational reasoning. Inasmuch as these biases are typically unconscious, arguers can be unfair and tendentious despite their genuine efforts to follow the rules of argumentation. I argue that arguers remain nevertheless responsible for the rationality of their reasoning, insofar as they can (and arguably ought to) counteract such biases by adopting indirect strategies of argumentative self-control.Résumé: Les théories normatives de l'argumentation tendent à présumer que les règles de la logique et de la dialectique suffisent pour assurer la rationalité du discours argumentatif. Pourtant, la recherche empirique sur l'inférence humaine montre que nous sommes souvent affectés par des biais cognitifs et motivationnels qui conduisent à diverses formes de raisonnement irrationnel. Etant donné que ces biais sont inconscients, chacun peut se montrer tendancieux en dépit de l'effort pour respecter les règles d'argumentation. Je soutiens que chacun demeure néanmoins responsable de la rationalité de ses raisonnements, dans la mesure où l'on peut neutraliser ces biais moyennant certaines stratégies d'autocontrôle argumentatif.

Teaching Philosophy through Lincoln-Douglas Debate

“…Second, the assumption of disagreement forces debaters to debate both sides of a topic. Even when a debater's convictions are on one side of a controversial proposition, the practice of devil's advocacy has significant virtues (Correia 2012). It fosters the virtue of argumentative charity, for example, by encouraging debaters to appreciate the strongest objections to their own views.…”

The ethics of arguing

“…To take another instance, the cognitive virtues of open-mindedness and the ability to understand others' positions work as crucial bulwarks against prejudicial and dismissive reactions to others' views and actions, a potent source of morally worrying intolerance. Argumentation virtues-of the kind found in shared deliberation-can engrain habits of mind that push back against both cold (cognitive) and hot (emotional) biases, rendering us less vulnerable to this source of intolerance (Correia 2012).…”

Introduction: Virtues and Arguments

“…This reflects a wider interest in recognizing and responding to argumentative injustice, or the role of epistemic privilege within argument (Bondy 2010;Kotzee 2010;Linker 2011Linker , 2014Yap 2013Yap , 2015. A virtue approach has been applied to these questions too (Correia 2012).…”