The End of the Hungarian Hyperinflation of 1945-1946

The Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1992–1994: Causes, Dynamics, and Money Supply Process

“…The fiscal deficit increased from 3% of GDP in 1990 to 28% in hyperinflationary 1993 and reached 71% of total expenditures. The level and dynamics of the deficit are similar to those recorded in other classical hyperinflations, such as in Austria and Germany in the 1920s, and Hungary in the 1940s Fischer, 1986, for Austria andGermany, andSiklos, 1989 for Hungary).…”

Stopping High Inflation: An Analytical Overview

“…Cagan (1956), Yeager (1981), Sargent (1982), Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), and Siklos (1989), among many others, have studied these episodes exhaustively. Taiwanese Hperinflation 1/ The Taiwanese hyperinflation is much less known compared to its European counterparts.…”

“…The Olivera-Tanzi effect is named after Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977); see also Aghevli and Khan (1978) and Dixit (1990). (Siklos (1989)). The same is true of the Bolivian hyperinflation, where inflation was halted within ten days of the announcement of the stabilization program, on September 29, 1985.…”

Hyperinflations: Their Origins, Development and Termination

“…Wicker (1986) has reconsidered the evidence from the end of hyperinflation in Poland, Austria and Hungary, following the dismemberment of the Habsburg monarchy, and found the increases in unemployment too large to be consistent with the natural rate view. Siklos (1989) found the unemployment effect of a sudden return to price stability in post-World War I1 Hungary rather small and, therefore, not inconsistent with Sargent's view (see also Bomberger and Makinen 1983), although many policy choices faced by the Hungarian government following the war would unlikely have arisen in more recent hyperinflationary experiences such as in, for example, South America. Garber (1982) argues that the assumption of a constant natural rate of unemployment underlying Sargent's hypothesis is misleading in the German case because a significant portion of the proceeds from the inflation tax went to the capital goods producing industry.…”

“…When the subsidy policy was eventually abandoned the result was a structural distortion in the economy with a consequent impact on the natural rate of unemployment. 22 Siklos (1989) notes that a similar problem may exist in interpreting unemployment rates in Hungary following the return to price stability in 1946 when government-make work projects were terminated, and when a policy favouring a higher price for industrial goods relative to agricultural commodities, to encourage rapid recovery and expansion in the former industry, was abandoned. Of course, the key element in persuading the public to radically modify its expectations must be the government's reputation and ability to convince the public of the credibility of the set of policies whose objective it is to produce more stability.…”