“…First, the incentives to adopt better governance practices are likely to be greater for private firms since they had generally poor performance and weak governance structures prior to reform and are likely to benefit more from adopting better governance practices (e.g., Chen et al, 2009). Consistent with this view, several studies have reported a much stronger and positive impact of Chinese corporate governance reforms on private-controlled firms (e.g., Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006;Conyon and He, 2011;Li et al, 2011;Qian and Zhao, 2011;Tang et al, 2013). For example, Berkman et al (2010) show that the positive market reaction to three new regulations introduced by the CSRC in 2000 to protect minority shareholders against expropriation is stronger for firms with private controlling blockholders and weaker for blockholders with strong connections with government.…”
Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Second, we contribute to the growing body of literature that examines the impact on firm value of several corporate governance reforms implemented in China since 2000 (e.g., Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006;Li et al, 2011;Qian and Zhao, 2011;Tang et al, 2013;Liu et al, 2015).…”
“…First, the incentives to adopt better governance practices are likely to be greater for private firms since they had generally poor performance and weak governance structures prior to reform and are likely to benefit more from adopting better governance practices (e.g., Chen et al, 2009). Consistent with this view, several studies have reported a much stronger and positive impact of Chinese corporate governance reforms on private-controlled firms (e.g., Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006;Conyon and He, 2011;Li et al, 2011;Qian and Zhao, 2011;Tang et al, 2013). For example, Berkman et al (2010) show that the positive market reaction to three new regulations introduced by the CSRC in 2000 to protect minority shareholders against expropriation is stronger for firms with private controlling blockholders and weaker for blockholders with strong connections with government.…”
Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Second, we contribute to the growing body of literature that examines the impact on firm value of several corporate governance reforms implemented in China since 2000 (e.g., Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006;Li et al, 2011;Qian and Zhao, 2011;Tang et al, 2013;Liu et al, 2015).…”
“…To the extent that director dissent signals negative quality of the firm (Tang, Du, and Hou, ), independent directors who feel indebted to the person for offering the directorship are motivated to conform to that person's initiatives. We thus propose that director dissent is positively associated with a breakdown of the social exchange relationship between the independent director and the board chair who appointed the director. Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, dissent is less likely to occur in firm‐years in which a higher proportion of independent directors are appointed by the board chair . Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris Paribus, an independent director is more likely to voice dissent after his or her appointing chair left the board .…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning
“…To boost the effectiveness of independent directors, the CSRC introduced a practice that differs from those adopted in other developed markets: that is, independent directors are obliged to publicly disclose their opinions on important board decisions such as the appointment of top executives, managerial compensation, financial reporting, material related-party transactions, and important investment decisions (CSRC, 2001). Tang, Du, and Hou (2013) utilise this record and find that firms with more independent directors saying 'no' can help to protect the interests of outside investors.…”
Section: Board Structure Ceo Turnover and Dividend Payoutmentioning
China’s stock market has gone through major structural changes since its inception in the early 1990s. In this survey article, we review the empirical literature published in 15 leading accounting and finance journals from 1998 to 2013 that documents these important structural changes. In analysing this literature, we focus on the ‘distinctiveness’ of the Chinese stock market compared with developed stock markets (e.g. US) and the research opportunities generated by the China setting. Key themes include China’s share issue privatisation (SIP) reforms, the political connections in privately owned companies, the characteristics of Chinese listed companies and their governance, the regulatory environment reforms in China, and the evolving role played by auditors and other information intermediaries.
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