The effect of gubernatorial political parties on monitoring and enforcement of federal environmental regulation: evidence from the Clean Water Act

Elrod, Aaron A.; Karadas, Serkan; Theyson, Katherine C.

doi:10.1007/s10018-018-0226-9

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

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“…Leigh's (2008) findings support this premise; he finds no relationship between a state governor's political party and 26 of 32 outcomes ranging from corporate tax rates to welfare caseloads. Similarly, Helland (1998) found that having a Democrat governor had no effect on the probability that a plant received a clean water inspection by the state; and Elrod et al (2018) found that although states with Democrat governors inspect a smaller percentage of their major water polluters, enforcement actions did not vary based on political affiliation. On the other hand, Devlin (2002) found no-fault auto insurance provisions, which are viewed as a type of government intervention, were more likely than strict-liability provisions in states led by Democrat governors.…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Political Regime on State-Level Disciplinary Actions of CPAs Sanctioned by the PCAOB

2021

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We investigate whether enforcement is influenced by politics by comparing the severity of PCAOB sanctions of individual CPAs to the severity of related state-level disciplinary actions imposed by boards of accountancy (BOAs). Our results provide evidence that when responding to PCAOB sanctions, BOAs under Republican regimes impose less severe penalties than do BOAs under Democratic regimes. Our data and analyses inform the regulatory and enforcement practices of the accounting profession and other professions. Most directly, motivated by improvements in technology that facilitate the cross-jurisdiction practice of public accounting, states have adopted mobility laws where CPAs are only required to be licensed in their state of residence to practice in multiple states. These laws simplify licensing but may complicate enforcement. Beyond generalized red-state, blue-state differences in enforcement, we find that non-resident CPAs receive less severe disciplinary actions. If not reasonably consistent across BOAs, regulators may be unwilling to delegate responsibility for enforcement to another state's BOA.

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