This study aims to explore whether Saudi listed companies are using performance measures to evaluate their internal audit function and, if they are, what performance measures they use to evaluate internal audit function and the identity of the important measures from the perspective of internal auditors. A questionnaire was designed and distributed to internal auditors in Saudi listed companies. The results show that Saudi listed companies are using both quantitative and quantitative performance measures to assess the internal audit function performance. Also, we find that internal auditors rank quantitative measures as important while qualitative measures are ranked as unimportant. The current study contributes to the existing literature by identifying key performance measures for the internal audit function in an emerging market, and provides valuable information about how to measure internal auditing performance. Also, this study is considered as the first one in Saudi market that identify such variable.

We investigate whether enforcement is influenced by politics by comparing the severity of PCAOB sanctions of individual CPAs to the severity of related state-level disciplinary actions imposed by boards of accountancy (BOAs). Our results provide evidence that when responding to PCAOB sanctions, BOAs under Republican regimes impose less severe penalties than do BOAs under Democratic regimes. Our data and analyses inform the regulatory and enforcement practices of the accounting profession and other professions. Most directly, motivated by improvements in technology that facilitate the cross-jurisdiction practice of public accounting, states have adopted mobility laws where CPAs are only required to be licensed in their state of residence to practice in multiple states. These laws simplify licensing but may complicate enforcement. Beyond generalized red-state, blue-state differences in enforcement, we find that non-resident CPAs receive less severe disciplinary actions. If not reasonably consistent across BOAs, regulators may be unwilling to delegate responsibility for enforcement to another state's BOA.