The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation

Abstract

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Cooperation in viscous populations—Experimental evidence

“…The pattern of cooperator types we find is roughly consistent with results byFischbacher et al (2001),Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) orBrandts and Schram (2001).4 See alsoOnes and Puttermann (2007).…”

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

“…They extend the findings of Page et al (2005) and Gächter and Thöni (2005) by testing whether cooperative preferences are stable over time and whether differences in group outcomes can be predicted by knowing the types of participants who compose those groups. Like Gunnthorsdottir et al (2007), Ones and Putterman (2007) find that early contributions can serve as a significant predictor of contributions in later periods. Moreover the combination of own type measures coupled with measures of experiences of interacting with other groups members can explain substantial parts of the variation in later contributions by participants.…”

“…Charness and Yang (2007) undertake a more elaborate investigation where participants are not only free to leave their current groups as in Ehrhart and Keser (1999) but they can also vote to expel group members as in Cinyabuguma et al (2006). 33 Ones and Putterman (2007) also study the impact of costly punishments in a situation where groups are sorted according to their levels of cooperation and find that groups consisting of participants with similar cooperative tendencies outperform randomly composed groups. They extend the findings of Page et al (2005) and Gächter and Thöni (2005) by testing whether cooperative preferences are stable over time and whether differences in group outcomes can be predicted by knowing the types of participants who compose those groups.…”

What norms trigger punishment?

“…Examples includeMasclet et al (2003),Anderson and Putterman (2005),Falk et al (2005),Cinyabuguma et al (2006), Carpenter (2007a andNikiforakis (2008).2 The model inFalkinger (1996) is later tested in the lab byFalkinger et al (2000).3 This work includesDecker et al (2003),Anderson and Putterman (2005),Ertan et al (2005),Sefton et al (2005), Carpenter (2007b,Ones and Putterman (2007). Exceptions includeKosfeld et al (2006) who model a "contribute everything" norm andNikiforakis (2008) andGächter and Herrmann (2006) who examine the norm of contribute as much as the monitor.4 The study of third party punishment has roots in the psychological literature on the "bystander effect"(Latane and Darley 1970) which was sparked by the murder, witnessed by many neighbors who did nothing, of Kitty Genovese in 1964.…”