Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment Jeffrey Carpenter Peter Hans Matthews John Schirm D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability and output in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on the impact of sabotage because real world acts of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss a real effort experiment in which effort, quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments. Our results suggest that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors are more likely to sabotage each other in tournaments and, as a result, workers actually provide less effort simply because they expect to be the victims of sabotage. Adjusting output for quality with the rating of an independent auditor shrinks the incentive effect of the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod. JEL Classification:C92, J33, J41

Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. We conduct field experiments to see which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay, raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field.Few people appreciate the size of the philanthropic market, the amount of funding that flows through charities, and the time and resources devoted to fundraising activities each year. For example, total giving to charitable organisations in the US in 2004 amounted to nearly $250 billion (Giving USA 2005) and, according to a survey by Forbes Magazine, 200 major charities spent over $2.5 billion on fundraising activities in 2001. 1 Despite the obvious size and importance of the market for philanthropy, surprisingly little is known about the fund-raising mechanisms most likely to generate the greatest revenue for non-profit organisations.A variety of mechanisms are used to raise money for charities or to fund public goods. Secondary schools and religious congregations frequently rely on bakesales and raffles; institutes of higher education often employ student call centres and mass alumni mailings; hospitals host benefit concerts etc. (Andreoni, 2004). Interestingly, many non-profits raise revenue through auctions and, with the success of internet sites like Ebay, the popularity of charity auctions has increased. 2 The items auctioned vary to a large degree (e.g., local artwork, gift certificates for community services, weekend getaways, cars etc.), but there are relatively few auction mechanisms that are used with any regularity. One of the most common is the silent auction which corresponds closely to the standard oral ascending (or English) auction in which bids are called out sequentially. The only major difference is that participants write bids down by some pre-specified time instead of calling them out. Considering sealed bids, one may occasionally see the first price auction and to a lesser extent, the second price (or Vickrey) auction implemented. However, all-pay auctions in which participants forfeit their bids regardless of whether they win or lose are rare. We think that we know why.While the empirical literature remains thin, theory is not silent on the revenue generating properties of different charity auction mechanisms. Our immediate concern in this article is the proposition (Engers and McManus, 2002;Goeree et al., 2005)

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004Social dilemma, Punishment, Norm, Evolutionary game theory, Experiment,

The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third-party punishment is surprisingly thin. In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to replicate the anger-based punishment of directly affected second parties and evaluate two distinct explanations for third-party punishment: indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency. (JEL: C79, C91, C92, D64, H41)

Public good, Experiment, Punishment, Social norm, Norm enforcement, C72, C92, H41,