The Dynamics of Radicalization

Abstract

To add this web app to the home screen open the browser option menu and tap on Add to homescreen. The dynamics of radicalization: a relational and comparative. Drawing on a comparative historical analysis of al-Qaeda, the Red Brigades, the Cypriot EOKA, the authors develop a relational, mechanism-based theory that advances our understanding of political violence in several important ways by identifying turning points in the radicalization process, similar mechanisms at work .

Combates verbales en Twitter. El caso de la expresidenta argentina Fernández de Kirchner en las elecciones legislativas de 2017

“…En algunas de esas perspectivas, además, las nociones de radicalización y de polarización son prácticamente intercambiables, con lo cual no se recaba en la diferencia entre procesos de agrupamiento o alineación (movimientos de desplazamiento) y procesos de profundización de posicionamientos políticos (movimientos de enraizamiento). En otros casos (como en Alimi et al, 2015), la radicalización implica violencia armada o daño físico de facto, y lleva a analizar los procesos en los cuales los movimientos sociales organizados transforman sus acciones no violentas en violentas, o bien, logran frenar (Non-Radicalization) o mitigar (De-Radicalization) de modos variados ese paso hacia la violencia física.…”

“…En este texto se comparte, sin embargo, que la radicalización puede apareceraunque no únicamente -como síntoma, plan o fase inicial de la violencia física (Alimi et al, 2015). El deseo de pasar a la agresión corporal, la premeditación de esas formas de violencia, o bien, la etapa previa al paso hacia ellas, dan cuenta de sentidos de la radicalización que llevan a examinar las coyunturas y los discursos en las cuales aparece como propensión a la violencia o como agresión física potencial.…”

The internal brakes on violent escalation: a typology

“…Activists might not envisage engaging in violence at a particular point in time, but might imagine themselves doing so in the future, under different circumstances. Furthermore, activists' self-image is dynamic, shaped by their relationships with opponents or state security forces (Alimi et al, 2015). Among Al-Muhajiroun activists, for example, their self-identification as a group not engaged in violent struggle was severely undermined by their dismissal of the 'covenant of security' it purported to respect within the UK (Connor, 2005).…”

“…Whereas boundary activation or hardeningthe process whereby social interaction is increasingly focussed around essentialising us-against-them narrativescan fuel violent escalation by accentuating feelings of fear, distrust and hate, boundary softening or complexification can inhibit escalation (Alimi et al, 2015;Chirot & McCauley, 2006;Fiske & Rai, 2015;Tilly, 2004). It does this by breaking down clear 'us-versus-them' distinctions, leaving group members comparatively more 'open' to engagement with opponents, state actors and sections of the public they might previously have considered only as a pool of active or latent support for their opponents (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 248), thereby creating new opportunities for the application of brakes based on strategic or moral logics.…”

“…It seems somewhat surprising therefore that while there has in recent decades been considerable investment in understanding how and why political violence, particularly that involving actors from 'extremist groups', 1 escalates (e.g. Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi, 2015;Borum, 2011;McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017), and while there has also been significant attention given to processes of deescalation or de-radicalisation (e.g. Becker, 2017;Crenshaw, 1991;Cronin, 2009;Ross & Gurr, 1989), processes of non-or limited-escalationwhy extremists or extremist groups don't do more violence than they dohave received far less attention (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2017;Cragin, 2014;Simi & Windisch, 2018).…”