The Costs of Intraparty Competition: SNTV and Money Politics in Japan

Cox, Gary W.; Thies, Michael

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1158650

Cited by 41 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Under SNTV, much of the intraparty competition takes place in the general election stage, as parties routinely nominate multiple candidates in the same district. While the optimal strategy is for a party to nominate the "right" number of candidates and then distribute its support evenly among them Cox and Thies 1998;Browne and Patterson 1999), overnomination is not always a disaster. If more than the appropriate number of candidates insists on running and no compromise can be found, the party can sometimes simply let them all run and let the electorate decide which is the weakest.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Numerous studies traced these disadvantages to SNTV Cox and Thies 1998;Richardson 1988;Yeh-li Wang 2011). Because of continuous scandals and the ineficiency of parliament, subsequent electoral reform enjoyed widespread public support (Shiratori 1995;Yu Wang 2011).…”

Section: Party Politics Under Sntv In Japan and Taiwanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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“…Under SNTV, a politician's fate is tied to his ability to deliver particular governmental benefits to his/her constituency and distribute gifts and personal favors (Cox and Thies 1998). In Afghanistan, this is no different: MPs are often viewed as direct advocates of their constituencies, whether they are tribes, solidarity groups, or other communities, and they are expected to divert funds, resources, or aid to these areas.…”

Section: Parliamentary Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybrid democracy: electoral rules and political competition in Afghanistan

Gomes

2018

Rev. bras. polít. int.

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• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da AbstractDeparting from the hybridity literature on peacebuilding and electoral studies, this paper treats democratization in Afghanistan as a hybridization process. As a result, to understand the durability of corruption, fragile political parties, and non-democratic practices in the country, one should look more closely at the interplay between the current electoral system and how elites and local people respond to it.

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“…In Japan, under the SNTV system in which district magnitude generally ranged from one to five, same-party candidates of the largest ruling party, the Liberal Democrats, competed for a seat. The SNTV system encourages individual legislators to cultivate "personal votes" rather than to collectively pursue a coherent party label (Cox and Thies 1998;Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1994, and many others). Moreover, since votes that individual legislators win in a district are not transferable to other same-party candidates, individual legislators have incentives to specialize either geographically (Hirano 2006) or sectorally (McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995) to differentiate themselves from other same-party candidates (Tatebayashi 2004).…”

Section: Policymaking Environment: Electoral Institutions and Legislamentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems

Naoi

Krauss

2009

American J Political Sci

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Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? We theorize lobbying venue choices and intensity as a function of contract enforceability with policy makers, politicians, or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups, in particular, whether they are centralized or decentralized, substantially affect their lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy makers and punish them when they fail. We further demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional on the types of electoral system: majoritarian, semiproportional (single, nontransferable vote: SNTV), or proportional representation systems. We test this argument using longitudinal survey data on lobbying which span two decades and cover around 250 interest groups in various sectors and issue areas in Japan. The results lend strong support to our argument about contract enforceability under alternative electoral systems.

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The Costs of Intraparty Competition: SNTV and Money Politics in Japan

Cited by 41 publications

References 10 publications

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Hybrid democracy: electoral rules and political competition in Afghanistan

Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems

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