Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems

Naoi, Megumi; Krauss, Ellis S.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00406.x

Cited by 43 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Lobbying is the preferred mobilization mechanism to influence policymakers among developed nations (see de Figueiredo & Richter, 2014;Harstad & Svensson, 2011;Naoi & Krauss, 2009) but is also prevalent in transitional economies (Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011) and in the developing world (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007). Lobbying may imply an exchange that benefits an individual legislator, her constituency, or a wider sector of the population but also credible threats to withhold such benefits.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of the fossil fuel and emission‐intensive industries on the stringency of mitigation policies: Evidence from the OECD countries and Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa

Stevens

2019

Env Pol Gov

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article assesses the effects of different industrial sectors on the design of marketbased policies that mitigate climate change. It claims that the emission-intensive and fossil fuel industries, especially those exposed to trade, have a negative impact on the stringency of domestic market-based mitigation policies, namely, carbon taxes and Emission Trading Systems (ETS). To address endogeneity between industrial and policy outputs, the empirical analysis resorts to a nontraditional instrumental variable method constructing instruments with heteroskedastic errors in the data. With a dataset that covers 34 countries from 1990 to 2015, the analysis shows that there is a negative and statistically significant association between these industries and policy stringency, albeit in a differentiated way. Whereas the upstream fossil fuel industries have a negative relationship with carbon taxes, the power industry was only negatively associated with ETS. Emission-intensive manufacturers and the downstream fossil fuels industry have a negative effect on both policies. The design and practical applications of each policy explain the disparities; although ETS regulate larger emission-intensive installations such as power plants, carbon taxes tend to impose tariffs on activities that are not necessarily emission-intensive, such as oil extraction or specific fuels. The results, robust to different estimation methods, support that larger industrial outputs are significantly associated with less stringent mitigation policies.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of the fossil fuel and emission‐intensive industries on the stringency of mitigation policies: Evidence from the OECD countries and Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa

Stevens

2019

Env Pol Gov

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Capitalizing on the fact that legislators have limited time, resources, and attention, claimants supply information and issue framing to sympathetic political elites. Studies of lobbying find that it usually targets like‐minded legislators, bolstering their coincident objectives rather than changing the minds of legislators who disagree (Hall and Deardorff ; Naoi and Krauss ). Information uncovered through courts' fact‐finding has heightened credibility.…”

Section: Litigation's “Radiating Effects” and The Mechanisms Behind Themmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mechanisms behind Litigation's “Radiating Effects”: Historical Grievances against Japan

Arrington¹

2019

Law Soc Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Scholars argue that litigation can have positive and negative “radiating” or indirect effects for social movements, irrespective of formal judicial decisions. They see litigation as a dynamic process with distinctive features yet nonetheless intertwined with advocacy in other forums. Litigation can indirectly shape collective identities, reframe debates, or provide political leverage. However, the mechanisms behind these radiating effects are poorly understood. Through an analysis of lawsuits and related activism by Korean survivors of Japanese actions in the first half of the twentieth century, this article disaggregates the mechanisms behind litigation's productive indirect effects. It theorizes and illustrates mechanisms such as attribution of similarity, brokerage, issue dramatization, political cover, and intergroup discussions. These mechanisms help us understand how litigants obtain litigation's indirect effects and thus also the broader impact of postwar compensation lawsuits in East Asia, despite few judicial victories. The article contributes non‐Western and transnational cases to scholarship on litigation's indirect effects.

show abstract

“…Within the lobbying literature, the essay does investigate legislative lobbying but does not explicitly pursue the large literature on lobbying of bureaucratic agencies that deserves its own analysis. Papers in this latter area include Naoi & Krauss (2009);de Figueiredo & Tiller (2001); Holburn & Vanden Bergh (2004); McKay (2011); de Figueiredo & Kim (2004); Yackee & Yackee (2006), McKay & Yackee (2007), and McKay (2011) know about lobbying, and how we might make headway in finding the answers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%