The Concept of Political Competence

Brinkmann, Matthias

doi:10.1080/08913811.2018.1572974

Cited by 27 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…These provide neither the stability nor the fruitfulness that political understanding provides. Accordingly, in his recent analysis of political competence, Matthias Brinkmann (2018, 169) describes political understanding , not true political belief or political knowledge, as what is fundamentally needed for democratic citizens competently to vote and reason about politics.…”

Section: Political Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Understanding

Lepoutre

2022

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Public opinion research has shown that voters accept many falsehoods about politics. This observation is widely considered troubling for democracy – and especially participatory ideals of democracy. I argue that this influential narrative is nevertheless flawed because it misunderstands the nature of political understanding. Drawing on philosophical examinations of scientific modelling, I demonstrate that accepting falsehoods within one's model of political reality is compatible with – and indeed can positively enhance – one's understanding of that reality. Thus, the observation that voters accept many political falsehoods does not necessarily establish that they lack political understanding. I then address three worries: that voters cannot generally engage in such political modelling; that political modelling obscures facts that are crucial to political understanding; and that successful political modelling would require knowing that one's model contains falsehoods. My responses reveal how, going forward, we should measure political ignorance, and they highlight the standing importance of participatory democracy.

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Section: Political Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Understanding

Lepoutre

2022

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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“…A well-informed voter needs to be able to assess whether the candidates' preferred policies would tend to promote or impede the voter's favored outcomes. So, for example, suppose I know candidates Smith and Colbert both want to improve 2 Brinkmann (2018) is, as far as I can tell, the only other philosopher who has addressed this important question at length. Much of what I say is amenable to Brinkmann's theory.…”

Section: On Political Competencementioning

confidence: 99%

“… 2 Brinkmann (2018) is, as far as I can tell, the only other philosopher who has addressed this important question at length. Much of what I say is amenable to Brinkmann's theory.…”

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confidence: 99%

Finding the Epistocrats

Kogelmann

2022

Episteme

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Concerned about widespread incompetence among voters in democratic societies, epistocrats propose quasi-democratic electoral systems that amplify the voices of competent voters while silencing (or perhaps just subduing) the voices of those deemed incompetent. In order to amplify the voices of the competent we first need to know what counts as political competence, and then we need a way of identifying those who possess the relevant characteristics. After developing an account of what it means to be politically competent, I argue that there is no way for the epistocrat to identify such persons. Therefore, epistocracy cannot be implemented.

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“…For example, you might care, and know a lot, about local education policy, or the moral and legal arguments surrounding pornography legislation, or the environmental issues concerning wildlife preserves. But while each of us might be competent in such limited ways, for most political issues we are not (Brinkmann 2018).…”

Section: Two Principled Defences Of Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

“… 29 For defences of optimism, see the references throughout. For a defence of the picture of democracy I rely on, see Brinkmann (2018) and references there.…”

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confidence: 99%

In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Brinkmann

2020

Episteme

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Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that (i) deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and (ii) most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference to be untroubling: political problems are difficult and require a division of epistemic labour; furthermore, there is value in exercising epistemic solidarity with those one shares an identity or interests with.

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The Concept of Political Competence

Cited by 27 publications

References 50 publications

Political Understanding

Political Understanding

Finding the Epistocrats

In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

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