The Introduction sets the stage by arguing that, in their current form, normative ideals of democratic public discourse tend to be too distant from reality to yield action-guiding prescriptions. Perhaps inclusive public speech is a powerful way of pooling knowledge or contesting power when people who like each other exchange reasons in good faith. But this tells us very little about the value of inclusive public speech in divided settings such as our own, where speech is routinely used to rage, vilify, or deceive, against a background of mutual dislike, political ignorance, and social fragmentation. The Introduction then argues that, to remedy this problem, we need to develop a systematic normative picture of democratic public speech—and specifically, of the norms that should govern democratic public speech—that is sensitive to these non-ideal features.
Ignorant speech, which spreads falsehoods about people and policies, is pervasive in public discourse. A popular response to this problem recommends countering ignorant speech with more speech, rather than legal regulations. However, Mary Kate McGowan has influentially argued that this ‘counterspeech’ response is flawed, as it overlooks the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms: the phenomenon whereby some conversational norms are easier to enact than subsequently to reverse. After demonstrating that this conversational ‘stickiness’ is an even broader concern for counterspeech than McGowan suggests—it applies not just to oppressive or hateful speech, but also to ordinary policy-related misinformation—I argue that a more sophisticated account of counterspeech can nevertheless overcome it. First, the stickiness objection overlooks the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ counterspeech. Instead of directly negating a distorted proposition, positive counterspeech affirms a correct proposition that is inconsistent with the falsehoods at hand. This, I contend, allows it to counter ignorant speech without triggering the properties that render it sticky. Second, the stickiness objection presupposes an unrefined conception of counterspeech’s temporality. Counterspeech should be understood as a diachronic process, which not only follows, but also pre-empts, ignorant utterances. Drawing on speech-act theories of silencing, I argue that pre-emptive counterspeech can condition the conversational context so as to prevent subsequent ignorant utterances from enacting sticky conversational norms. Thus, this theoretically-refined conception of counterspeech helps appreciate how verbal responses might overcome the stickiness of conversational norms; and, in doing so, it reveals that this stickiness need not provide reasons to prefer legal remedies to counterspeech.
Democratic Speech in Divided Times offers a comprehensive account of the norms that should govern public discourse in circumstances marked by deep and often unjust social divisions. Part I investigates what forms of democratic speech are desirable in these settings. This part shows, firstly, that some forms of public discourse that are symptomatic of division can nevertheless play a crucial democratic function. In particular, it argues that emotionally charged speech—and most notably, speech voicing deep anger—plays a fundamental role in overcoming entrenched epistemic divisions and in facilitating the exchange of shared reasons. This part also examines how, in contrast, other characteristic features of the public discourse of divided societies endanger democratic life. Here, the argument considers the proliferation of hate speech and misinformation, and examines what forms of democratic speech should be used to combat them. Part II considers how realistic the foregoing account of public discourse is. Specifically, it assesses the complications that arise from intergroup antipathy, pervasive political ignorance, and the fragmentation of the public sphere. The normative picture of public discourse that this book defends can largely withstand these problems. And, while these social conditions do qualify the value of democratic speech in some respects, they are at least as problematic for political ideals that give up on inclusive democratic speech altogether. Accordingly, while realising the ideal of democratic speech that this book outlines is challenging, we should not lose patience with this task.
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