In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference

Abstract

Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that (i) deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and (ii) most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference to be untroubling: political problems are difficult and require a division of epistemic labour; furthermore, there is value in exercising epistemic solidarity with those one shares an identity or interests with.

Truth and Loyalty

“…2 Failure to recognize this leads to an insufficient understanding of how that relationship is playing out in our political culture and the potential ways forward available to us. In this regard, the paper aims to contribute to the recent body of literature that has challenged the supposed conflict between group loyalty and truth and explored how identities can be made “safe for democracy” (e.g., Brinkmann 2022; Chambers 2018; Darby and Martinez 2022; Lepoutre 2020). It gives us further reason for thinking that pitting loyalty against truthfulness at some very general or conceptual level is deeply misguided, though it does so on the quite different grounds that both speak to genuine human needs or dimensions of the human condition.…”