The Causal Exclusion Puzzle

Pineda, David

doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00148

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…12 As is well known, the CCP is a crucial premise in Kim's formulation of the problem of causal exclusion (e.g., Kim, 2005: chapter 2). See Pineda (2002) and Vicente (2006) for discussion. Tiehen (2014) points out that this move may not be wise, given that mental properties are not individuated in terms of their forward-looking causal powers.…”

Section: A Mind-body Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Pineda

Vicente

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind-body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: (i) how the physical grounds the mental; and (ii) why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind-body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind-body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental propertieResearch leading to this work has been partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, research grants FFI2012-37354, FFI2014-52196-P and Consolider-Ingenio Project CSD2009-00056

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Section: A Mind-body Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… As is well known, the CCP is a crucial premise in Kim's formulation of the problem of causal exclusion (e.g., Kim, : chapter 2). See Pineda () and Vicente () for discussion. …”

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Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Pineda

Vicente

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…One of the many important issues he raised is what he called the supervenience argument and now is most commonly referred to as the problem of causal exclusion. Twenty years ago, I published a paper on Kim's Causal Exclusion argument (Pineda 2002). It seemed to me a formidable problem for physicalists.…”

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Causal Exclusion and Grounding

Pineda¹

2022

ProtoSociology

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In this contribution, I critically discuss the thesis, advanced by some recent writers, that nonreductive physicalists can solve the problem of causal exclusion by resorting to the metaphysical notion of grounding. After discussing the many problems confronted by very recent versions of this proposal, I conclude that a version of Nonreductive Physicalism framed in terms of a notion of realization of properties is in a better position than Grounding Physicalism in order to successfully deal with a notoriously complex metaphysical issue such as the causal exclusion problem.

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Functional Reduction and Mental Causation

Moore

Campbell

2010

Acta Anal

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Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism-the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim's goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or leads to a view that is similar to one of the versions of non-reductive physicalism that he criticizes. We will show that depending on how certain key claims are interpreted, there are reasons for thinking functional reduction has these implications, in which case either Kim fails to provide a robust account of mental causation or there is reason to suspect that some of his criticisms of non-reductive physicalism are misguided.Keywords Mental causation . Functionalism . Jaegwon Kim . Non-Reductive physicalism . Reductionism . Donald DavidsonOver the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that nonreductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism-the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Since the point of adopting non-reductive physicalism is to preserve the significance and autonomy of the mental this is a very serious challenge, for if mental properties lack causal efficacy exactly how much autonomy and significance could they really have? While Kim at one time seemed optimistic about the ability of non-reductive physicalists to resolve this problem (Kim 1984; Acta Anal (2010) 25:435-446

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The Causal Exclusion Puzzle

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Causal Exclusion and Grounding

Functional Reduction and Mental Causation

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