Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Abstract

Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind-body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: (i) how the physical grounds the mental; and (ii) why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind-body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind-body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental propertieResearch leading to this work has been partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, research grants FFI2012-37354, FFI2014-52196-P and Consolider-Ingenio Project CSD2009-00056

Exclusion, subset realization, and part‐whole relations

“…Many (Audi, 2012;Kim, 2010;McLaughlin, 2007;Morris, 2011aMorris, , 2011bPineda & Vicente, 2017;Tiehen, 2014;Walter, 2010) have raised objections to the subset view. I am particularly interested in the one raised respectively by Morris (2011b) and Audi (2012) and followed by Pineda and Vicente (2017). This is what I call the M-A problem.…”

Rejecting epiphobia

“…For objections to the subset view, seeGillett (2003),McLaughlin (2007),Morris (2011Morris ( , 2013,Noordhof (2013), andPineda and Vincente (2017). For more recent defences of the core claim of the subset view, seeBaysan (2016Baysan ( , 2018Baysan ( , 2019a-which includes replies to some of the aforementioned critiques).…”

Does Mole’s Argument That Cognitive Processes Fail to Suffice for Attention Fail?

“…11 On his 'subset' model of realisation, property A realises property B when B's forward-looking causal features are a subset of A's forward-looking causal features. Philosophers have worried that his account does not solve the causal exclusion problem(Audi 2012;Pineda & Vicente 2017), that it results in the overdetermination of the mental by the physical(Morris 2011), and that it does not adequately explain why physical events entail mental events(McLaughlin 2007;Tiehen 2014).…”