PreliminariesPolysemy is usually characterized as the phenomenon whereby a single word form is associated with two or several related senses, as in (1) below:(1) draw a line; read a line; a line around eyes; a wash on a line; wait in a line; a line of bad decisions, etc.In this, it is contrasted with monosemy, on the one hand, and with homonymy, on the other. While a monosemous form has only one meaning, a homonymous form is associated with two or several unrelated meanings (e.g., coach; 'bus', 'sports instructor'), and is standardly viewed as involving different lexemes (e.g., COACH1, COACH2).Polysemy is pervasive in natural languages, and affects both content and function words. While deciding which sense is intended on a given occasion of use rarely seems to cause any difficulty for speakers of a language, polysemy has proved notoriously difficult to treat both theoretically and empirically. Some of the questions that have occupied linguists, philosophers and psychologists interested in the phenomenon concern the representation of polysemous senses in the mental lexicon, how we should deal with polysemous words in a compositional theory of meaning, how novel senses of a word arise in the course of communication, and how hearers, usually effortlessly, arrive at the contextually appropriate sense on a given occasion of use.The definition and delimitation of the polysemy phenomenon itself also remains a source of theoretical discussion across disciplines: how do we tell polysemy apart from monosemy on the one hand, and from homonymy on the other? At first glance, the contrast with monosemy is clearer: while a monosemous term has only a single meaning, a polysemous term is associated with several senses.However, the literature shows that distinguishing polysemy from monosemy is far from a trivial matter. A famous case in point is the debate between Jackendoff 2 (1992a) and Fodor (1998) Another type of test exploits the impossibility of anaphorically referring to different senses (Cruse, 2004a). For instance, in the sentence ?John read a line from his new poem. It was straight. the pronoun cannot simultaneously refer to a sense of line combinable with the modifier straight (e.g., 'long, narrow mark or band') and the sense of line in the previous sentence ('row of written/printed words'), which suggests that we have to do with a case of lexical ambiguity.However, such tests for identity of meaning do not give clear-cut answers (for a review, see Geeraerts, 1993). In particular, only a slight manipulation of the context can yield a different result, as shown by the following example (Norrick, 1981: 115):(2) a. ? Judy's dissertation is thought provoking though yellowed with age.b. Judy's dissertation is still thought provoking though yellowed with age.While the sentence in (2a) is zeugmatic -apparently due to the use of Judy's dissertation to refer to a type of informational content in the first conjunct and a physical object in the second conjunct -no zeugmatic effect occurs when the sentence is slightly altered ...

There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of lexical words, i.e., words that contribute with content to the meaning of sentences. This debate has coincided with a renewal in the study of polysemy, which has taken place in the psycholinguistics camp mainly. There is already a fruitful interbreeding between two lines of research: the theoretical study of lexical word meaning, on the one hand, and the models of polysemy psycholinguists present, on the other. In this paper I aim at deepening on this ongoing interbreeding, examine what is said about polysemy, particularly in the psycholinguistics literature, and then show how what we seem to know about the representation and storage of polysemous senses affects the models that we have about lexical word meaning.

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word school, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation.