The Bronze Soldier: Identity Threat and Maintenance in Estonia

Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements

“…After the Baltic States joined NATO, the CT-204, 2003, p. 7). 35 Russian officials insisted that this issue was distinct from the CFE, while NATO countries were violating the treaty's provisions by relocating U.S. personnel and equipment from bases in Germany to former Warsaw Pact countries. A Russian diplomat wrote in 2007 that Westerners' "peculiar logic" of asserting that a few hundred Russian troops in Transnistria posed an insuperable barrier to the ratification of the Adapted CFE, while thousands of well-armed U.S. troops in Bulgaria did not, proved that NATO had always acted in bad faith (Areshev, 2007).…”

“…The NATO signatories refused to ratify the treaty before Moscow made good on promises to withdraw its forces deployed to Georgia and Moldova (specifically, Transnistria) as part of the frozen conflicts in those states. 35 The imminent prospect of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, and particularly the Baltics, further complicated the issue of the Adapted CFE. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were not parties to either the original CFE or the adapted treaty-meaning that unlike existing NATO members, they were not subject to any treaty restrictions on the conventional forces that could be placed in their territories-and Moscow insisted that they needed to ratify the Adapted CFE prior to joining NATO.…”

“…The prospect of a successful integration into Western institutions-especially for Ukraine or Georgia-would be a serious blow to Russia's Eurasian project, to broader efforts to maintain its regional sphere of influence, and potentially to Russia's domestic stability. 35 Given the stakes, most Russian policymakers view continued Western efforts to expand ties with Ukraine and Georgia as clear evidence of negative intentions toward Russia. The extent to which future perceptions of negative NATO intent remain, worsen, or improve is likely to affect how aggressively and in what manner Russia responds to any future NATO posture enhancements.…”

“…For starters, it faces long-term population decline, partially offset by immigration from other post-Soviet countries, and a loss of skills in its workforce (partly because of its underinvestment in education and partly because of its dependence on low-skill immigrants to offset a declining Russian population). 35 Additionally, actors around the world are making ever-greater investments in renewable energy-investments that may make Russia's single largest export sector and the current basis of half of government revenue increasingly less valuable. Finally, endemic corruption acts as a major tax on productive activities in Russia; even before oil and gas prices began their precipitous decline in 2014, the Russian economy had slowed considerably because of the burden of corruption and inefficient investments.…”

“…44 The units comprise small headquarters staffs and function as coordination nodes between NATO forces during exercises or deployments. In particular, the units 35 NATO, 2015b. 43 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, pp.…”