The Australian News Media Bargaining Code: lessons for the UK, EU and beyond

Lee, Karen; Molitorisz, Sacha

doi:10.1080/17577632.2021.1963585

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Instead, they have only been able to register with the ACMA in the faint hope that a platform is designated (ACMA n.d.). The lack of designation also appears to favour large publishers who are more likely to have the resources, networks, and skills to initiate and successfully complete these negotiations (Lee and Molitorisz 2021). We see further evidence of this divide across the news industry by exploring how the government and the ACCC acted during this critical juncture.…”

Section: Publishersmentioning

confidence: 92%

Digital Platform Regulation

Hayashi,

Arai

2024

Digitalization and Competition Policy in Japan

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use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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Section: Publishersmentioning

confidence: 92%

Digital Platform Regulation

Hayashi,

Arai

2024

Digitalization and Competition Policy in Japan

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“…Pemerintah Australia menetapkan mekanisme arbitrase independen yang akan menentukan jumlah pembayaran yang adil kepada penerbit media berita jika tidak ada kesepakatan langsung di antara para pihak. Mekanisme ini bertujuan untuk melindungi kepentingan penerbit media berita dan memastikan perlindungan hak kekayaan intelektual ditegakkan secara efektif (Flew et al, 2023;Lee & Molitorisz, 2021;Packham, 2020).…”

Section: Melalui Regulasi Dan Kebijakan Ini Pemerintah Australia Mewa...unclassified

Ekonomi Politik Perlindungan Hak Kekayaan Intelektual: Studi Kasus Kebijakan Publisher Rights Australia Terhadap Google Dan Facebook

Bustami

2024

bhuvana

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Australian news media publishers are facing serious challenges as Google and Facebook emerge as digital platforms in the Australian media industry. They have transformed into the main pillars of media industry as they monopolize distribution and monetization of news content as well as the digital advertising market, thus dominate Australia’s digital market share. Their power and dominance in controlling the flow of information and digital advertising have drawn attention of the Australian government. In response, the Australian government enacted the publisher rights policy through adoption of the News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code (NMBC). Google and Facebook reacted strongly against the NMBC and threatened to close the services in Australia. This research aims to explain the reasons behind Australia’s enactment of the publisher rights policy against Google and Facebook. Using the analytical descriptive research methods combined with theory of regulatory mercantilism, concept of digital sovereignty, and concept of intellectual property rights, this study argues that enactment of the publisher rights policy is due to the imbalance of bargaining power between the Australian news media publishers and Google and Facebook. In addition, this policy was enacted due to the reduction in traditional revenue received by the traditional news media publishers as a result of declining advertising revenue, content purchases, and subscriptions that pose a threat to sustainability of Australia’s news media industry. Lastly, the adoption of the publisher rights policy is due to the centralized media power of Google and Facebook which endangers diversity of Australian news media.

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“…The problems created by the platformisation of news distribution are manifold. Firstly, dominant search and social media platforms have proven unreliable business partners, reluctant to notify news organisations of changes made to their algorithmic logic that affect content distribution and visibility (ACCC, 2019;Martin, 2019), or to contribute to the economic sustainability of news production (Lee & Molitorisz, 2021;Royal & Napoli, 2022). Secondly, as discussed in Section 4, platforms are not only direct competitors to news organisations for online advertising revenue but also frequently control the programmatic systems that manage advertising content elsewhere on the internet (ACCC, 2019;Braun, 2023).…”

Section: Platformisation Advertising and News Distributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Value of News: Aligning Economic and Social Value From an Institutional Perspective

Flew,

Stepnik

2024

MaC

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Journalism is considered essential to a functioning democracy. However, the continued viability of commercial news production is uncertain. News producers continue to lose advertising revenue to platform businesses dominating digital advertising markets, and alternate consumer direct revenue streams are not yet meeting the financial shortfall. This has led to questions of who should pay for news, the role of governments in maintaining news production viability, and whether digital platforms have social or economic responsibilities to pay news publishers. In this article, we seek to make explicit what is often implicit in such debates, which is the value of news. This is hard to know in advance as news is an experience good whose value and quality are only known after consuming it, and a credence good, whose perceived qualities may not be observable even after it is consumed. As such, preparedness to pay for news can be hard to ascertain, accentuated by the large amount of free news available online. This article seeks to use a value perspective to consider the relationship between individual consumer choices and questions of news’s value to society. Applying a new institutional economic perspective, it is observed that the value of news as a consumer product needs to be examined in relation to its value as a social good in democratic societies as both a media product and part of the institutional environment in which other social actors operate. We consider news’s social and economic value within a context of platformed news distribution and declining advertising revenues that appear to be structural and not cyclical.

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The Australian News Media Bargaining Code: lessons for the UK, EU and beyond

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Digital Platform Regulation

Digital Platform Regulation

Ekonomi Politik Perlindungan Hak Kekayaan Intelektual: Studi Kasus Kebijakan Publisher Rights Australia Terhadap Google Dan Facebook

The Value of News: Aligning Economic and Social Value From an Institutional Perspective

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