The assignment of functions to decentralized government: from theory to practice

Dafflon, Bernard

doi:10.4337/9780857932297.00015

Cited by 15 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…For example: (a) raising debt at the local level would entail higher regional costs but benefits for such stabilization would spill beyond regional borders, resulting in too little stabilization being effected; (b) monetization of local debt will create inflationary pressures and pose a threat for price stability; (c) currency stability requires that both monetary and fiscal policy functions be carried out by the centre alone; and (d) cyclical shocks are usually national in scope (symmetric across all regions) and therefore require a national response. Although these views have been challenged by several writers (Dafflon, 1992;Gramlich, 2001;Walsh, 1992) on theoretical and empirical grounds, they continue to command considerable following. Tanzi (1995) has argued that decentralization of the public sector, especially in developing countries, poses significant risks for the aggravation of macroeconomic problems.…”

Section: Conceptual Foundations Of Fiscal Decentralizationmentioning

confidence: 94%

Financial Resource Base of Sub‐national Governments and Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana

Inanga

Osei-Wusu²

2004

African Development Review

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The past two decades have witnessed numerous attempts in developing countries at institutionalizing decentralization. Political leaders tended, before then, to believe that centralized planning was the key to economic growth and development. Ghana has not been excluded from this wave towards the transfer of power, competences, resources and functions from the centre to local levels of government. While Ghana has achieved significant political and administrative decentralization as well as decentralized planning, fiscal decentralization has been the unyielding component of the process. This paper examines the desirability, or otherwise, of fiscal decentralization in the context of funding arrangements. It uses the funding regime model as a basis for analysing how regulatory provisions, political and economic factors and practices, determine financial capacity of sub-national governments. Evidence in the paper leads to the conclusion that sub-national governments in Ghana do not support fiscal autonomy. They, instead, prefer being served and financed by the central government.Re´sume´: Ces deux dernie`res de´cennies, les pays en de´veloppement ont mene´plusieurs initiatives pour institutionnaliser la de´centralisation. Auparavant, les hommes politiques avaient tendance a`croire que la planification centralise´e e´tait la cle´de la croissance e´conomique et du de´veloppement. Le Ghana n'a pas e´te´en reste par rapport a`cette vague de transfert de pouvoirs, compe´tences, ressources et de fonctions du gouvernement central vers les collectivite´s territoriales. Bien que ce pays ait pu re´aliser une de´centralisation significative dans les domaines politique, administratif et de la planification, il n'a pas encore re´ussi sa de´centralisation budge´taire. Cet article analyse l'opportunite´ou non de la de´centralisation budge´taire dans le cadre d'un me´canisme de financement. L'article utilise le mode`le du re´gime de financement comme base d'analyse de la fac¸on dont les dispositions re´glementaires, ainsi que les facteurs et pratiques politiques et e´conomiques, de´terminent la capacitef inancie`re des collectivite´s territoriales. Il ressort de l'article que les collectivite´s territoriales du Ghana n'ont pas la capacite´de ge´rer une autonomie financie`re. Elles pre´fe`rent, au contraire, eˆtre servies et finance´es par le gouvernement central.

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Section: Conceptual Foundations Of Fiscal Decentralizationmentioning

confidence: 94%

Financial Resource Base of Sub‐national Governments and Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana

Inanga

Osei-Wusu²

2004

African Development Review

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“…No obstante lo anterior, la propia literatura económica reconoce que la problemática en torno a la asignación de funciones entre niveles de gobierno, no se agota en la definición de aquello que podríamos llamar la asignación óptima. Definir una solución implica abordar un aspecto crítico en la organización del Estado, uno en el cual hay distribución de poder y por lo tanto implicancias políticas evidentes (Dafflon, 2006). El debate en torno a cómo se distribuye este poder contiene ingredientes históricos, culturales y por cierto también económicos.…”

Section: El Caso Generalunclassified

Descentralización del Estado y Terremoto: El caso de Chile

2011

Revista Estado, Gobierno Y Gestión Pública

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El presente artículo ofrece un marco analítico dentro del cual racionalizar y optimizar la gestión de catástrofes. El modelo planteado se basa en argumentos económicos tradicionales que justifican la acción del Estado, los cuales son puestos en el contexto de una función de producción de "seguridad ante catástrofes". Se examina el caso del terremoto de Chile del 27 de febrero del 2010, haciendo especial énfasis en la "tecnología" implícita en el manejo de sus efectos y las debilidades en la etapa de prevención.Palabras clave: Gestión de desastres; terremoto; Chile. Decentralization and Earthquake:The Case of Chile This paper provides an analytical framework in which to analyze and optimize disaster management. The model being proposed is based on traditional economic arguments that justify State action in the context of a production function which delivers "security in face of catastrophes".It examines the case of the Chilean earthquake of 27 February, 2010, emphasizing the implicit role of "technology" in managing potential effects and weaknesses at the prevention stage.

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“…One of the first sets of criteria for reassignment of functions and for coordination among the government ties was proposed by Wittmann (1973, as cited in Dafflon, 2006. This set of criteria has been adopted in Austria, Switzerland, and recently in transitional economies (Dafflon, 2006). This set of criteria can be categorized into three subgroups: (i) general policy criteria, (ii) financial and technical criteria, and (iii) efficiency criteria.…”

Section: Theoretical Foundations For Expenditure Assignmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%