The appointment, tenure and removal of judges under Commonwealth principles: a compendium and analysis of best practice

Borda, Aldo Zammit

doi:10.1080/03050718.2015.1093767

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This aligns with the principle of good practice emerging from the commonwealth states that although judicial members need not constitute a majority, the judiciary and the legal profession should account for at least half of the commission members. [51] Table 1. Current versus the proposed composition of the JAC.…”

Section: Composition Of the Judicial Appointments Commissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking Judicial Appointments in Malaysian Superior Courts: Constitutional Reforms

Kanapathy

2024

Atlantis Highlights in Social Sciences, Education and Humanities

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Judicial independence is significant in any justice system because the role of the judiciary is to provide a meaningful system of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature in line with the doctrine of separation of powers. Past researchers had shown that the enactment of the Judicial Appointments Commission Act (JACA) in 2009 did not introduce any true reforms in the Malaysian judicial appointments system. However, no previous scholars had proposed any comprehensive reforms to address these deficiencies in Malaysian laws. The objective of this paper is to address the weaknesses of the post-JACA laws governing the judicial appointment system and to propose relevant reforms to safeguard and uphold judicial independence in the Malaysian superior courts. The objective was achieved by using qualitative methods based on document analysis. The findings of the research showed that the constitutional role and powers of the Prime Minister must be curtailed and reformed to limit the involvement of the executive. In addition, the composition of the Malaysian Judicial Appointments Commission should be increased to include other relevant stakeholders. This requires amending the Federal Constitution, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009, and all other consequential laws.

show abstract

Section: Composition Of the Judicial Appointments Commissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking Judicial Appointments in Malaysian Superior Courts: Constitutional Reforms

Kanapathy

2024

Atlantis Highlights in Social Sciences, Education and Humanities

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The chief justice of the ECSC, who always originates from a member country of the OECS, is appointed by the UK while other justices and judges are appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. It is the convention that the UK acts on the recommendation of the heads of government of the OECS member states (Van Zyl Smit, 2015). So, we consider that this judicial system shared by ECSC members does not show signs of significant subordination to an external power and a score of 1 is assigned to every member of the ECSC.…”

Section: Component 3: Judicial Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

A composite index of formal sovereignty for small islands and coastal territories

Alberti¹,

Goujon

2019

ISJ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We build a composite index of formal sovereignty as an alternative to the binary classification 'Sovereign vs Affiliated' for the purpose of a comparative, quantitative analysis on a large sample of small islands. This index takes into account different degrees of sovereignty through the different attributes of sovereignty (diplomacy, executive, legislative, judicial, defence, and monetary). We use a conservative method to code the components and to aggregate them, trying to stay as simple and objective as possible, while remaining transparent and laying the foundations for future improvements. The index is calculated for a sample of 104 small islands and coastal territories. The results show that the binary classification based on United Nations (UN) membership is significantly limited, if not mistaken, because according to our index some territories which are not UN members have a higher sovereignty score than some UN members.

show abstract

Judicial Power in Myanmar and the Challenge of Judicial Independence

Crouch

Asia-Pacific Judiciaries

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The appointment, tenure and removal of judges under Commonwealth principles: a compendium and analysis of best practice

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Rethinking Judicial Appointments in Malaysian Superior Courts: Constitutional Reforms

Rethinking Judicial Appointments in Malaysian Superior Courts: Constitutional Reforms

A composite index of formal sovereignty for small islands and coastal territories

Judicial Power in Myanmar and the Challenge of Judicial Independence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About