Rethinking Judicial Appointments in Malaysian Superior Courts: Constitutional Reforms

Abstract

Judicial independence is significant in any justice system because the role of the judiciary is to provide a meaningful system of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature in line with the doctrine of separation of powers. Past researchers had shown that the enactment of the Judicial Appointments Commission Act (JACA) in 2009 did not introduce any true reforms in the Malaysian judicial appointments system. However, no previous scholars had proposed any comprehensive reforms to address these deficiencies in Malaysian laws. The objective of this paper is to address the weaknesses of the post-JACA laws governing the judicial appointment system and to propose relevant reforms to safeguard and uphold judicial independence in the Malaysian superior courts. The objective was achieved by using qualitative methods based on document analysis. The findings of the research showed that the constitutional role and powers of the Prime Minister must be curtailed and reformed to limit the involvement of the executive. In addition, the composition of the Malaysian Judicial Appointments Commission should be increased to include other relevant stakeholders. This requires amending the Federal Constitution, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009, and all other consequential laws.