The Anti-Incumbent Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

Abstract

Scholars concur that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have a strong proincumbent effect among beneficiaries. Although no study has properly focused on the overall effect of cash transfers on incumbents' national vote shares, most scholars have deduced that this effect is positive; i.e., that cash transfers lead to the expansion of incumbents' electoral bases. This article analyzes survey data from nearly all Latin American countries and confirms that beneficiaries of CCT programs are more likely to support incumbents. However, it also shows that CCT programs may induce many voters who were previously incumbent supporters to vote for the opposition. As a consequence, the overall impact of cash transfers on incumbents' vote shares is indeterminate; it depends on the balance between both patterns of behavioral changes among voters. This study is the first to report evidence that cash transfer programs may have significant anti‐incumbent effects.

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“…Ellis and Faricy (2011) similarly find that U.S. public opinion is unresponsive to the total amount of federal social welfare spending. And Corrêa and Cheibub (2016), reviewing several cash transfer programs in Latin America, actually find net anti -incumbent effects, driven by increases in support for the opposition among non-beneficiaries that outweigh increased support for the incumbent among beneficiaries. Camacho (2014) similarly identifies mixed impacts of cash transfers in Peru on trust in institutions-including reduced trust among non-beneficiaries-and finds no impacts on membership in social organizations.…”

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“…Other observers, however, claim that the popularity of these programs may reflect induced dependence and the political capture of beneficiaries (e.g., Hall 2008). Yet others argue that the net electoral impact for incumbents is negative, as nonrecipients turn away from incumbents (Corrêa and Cheibub 2016), or that there is no electoral impact (Bohn 2011).…”