The acceptability of counter-terrorism measures on urban mass transit in the UK

Abstract

The security and safety of urban mass transit systems continues to draw a great deal of government, media and public attention. The bombings in Madrid, London and Mumbai, suggest that new and "acceptable" approaches to counterterrorism may become important components of how urban mass transit systems are designed and operated in the future. Technical developments in security and counter-terrorism can provide a wide range of non-intrusive or overt design solutions to counter-terrorism. However, in implementing these design solutions the whole system performance needs to be considered. Undertaking qualitative research with a wide range of stakeholders (including the public, transit system designers and operators) the potential acceptability of certain technological approaches is assessed. Analysis of the findings suggests five broad acceptability factors governed by five influence variables. The acceptability factors include that counter-terrorism measures are more acceptable to transit designers and operators if they are tied in with complementary personal security and safety features, and are more acceptable to transit operators and the general public if they do not restrict the free flow of passengers through the transit network. These perspectives are dependent upon influence variables including whether there was a recent attack on a UK transit system and the Government's present 'level of threat' from terrorist attack. The impact of these findings is discussed along with suggestions for future research into acceptable counter-terrorism measures for transport.

Encouraging public reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail networks

“…Ongoing targeting of public transportation systems by both terrorist groups and lone actors since the 2004 Madrid train bombings -for example attacks on buses and trains in London, Moscow, Minsk, Istanbul, Brussels, Madhya Pradesh and Saint Petersburgcoupled with the security challenges associated with policing these complex networks, means that mass transit systems remain a counter-terrorism priority (Loukaitou-Sideris et al, 2006, Kappia et al, 2009. Trains and major transport hubs are a frequent terrorism target due to their level of accessibility and the impracticality of implementing airport-style security screening in these contexts (Riley, 2004, Kappia et al, 2009, Donald, 2013, Carter et al, 2016. Furthermore, crowded train carriages and subways maximise the number of potential casualties despite limited attack means (Jenkins and Trella, 2012), which is consistent with an increasing trend for terrorist groups to aim for mass casualties to provoke an emotional response from the public (Kappia et al, 2009, Europol, 2018.…”

“…Trains and major transport hubs are a frequent terrorism target due to their level of accessibility and the impracticality of implementing airport-style security screening in these contexts (Riley, 2004, Kappia et al, 2009, Donald, 2013, Carter et al, 2016. Furthermore, crowded train carriages and subways maximise the number of potential casualties despite limited attack means (Jenkins and Trella, 2012), which is consistent with an increasing trend for terrorist groups to aim for mass casualties to provoke an emotional response from the public (Kappia et al, 2009, Europol, 2018.…”

Risk‐Based Decision Support Tools: Protecting Rail‐Centered Transit Corridors from Cascading Effects

“…We cannot say precisely what criteria decisionmakers would use to evaluate risk‐based decision support tools that could help them. However, based on the risk and planning literatures, and the authors’ collective experiences from interviewing over 50 decisionmakers from the transit industry at meetings across the United States, we compiled 15 criteria they likely would focus on ( 45‐52 ) (Table I).…”

The need for developing an effective and acceptable engineering response to terrorist attacks on railway systems

“…An important consideration for the implementation of resilient design is the acceptability of the measures adopted. 'Acceptability' cannot be easily defined as different people have a range of views and perceptions about what is acceptable depending on their role (manager, security personnel, passenger, or otherwise) and personal judgements [21]. These views can often change over time in response to other influences such as subsequent attacks locally or worldwide, or to long periods of stability.…”