Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism

Abstract

I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one.

B‐Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism1

“…10 10 For discussions of the relative merits of these two argument types, see (Diekemper 2004), (Gaskin 1995), (Sorabji 1980), and (Zagzebski 1991). …”

“…15 15 This is the reason that I eschew the modal characterization of the asymmetry, since, if I am right, it is possible that the future be fixed in a way that threatens fatalism without it being fixed—or fixed in just that way—in all possible worlds. See (Diekemper 2004). …”