How is the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past to be characterized?

Grandjean, Vincent

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02164-2

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Henceforth I assume that there is some satisfying account of the metaphysical difference between the past and the future insofar as the past is fixed (as is the present) and the future is open, and I assume that there is some metaphysical difference between that past and the present that allows one to circumvent the epistemic or "when am I" objection. See also Grandjean's (2021) discussion of the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future.…”

Section: Open Futurismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom and the open future

Cohen

2022

Philosophical Books

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Section: Open Futurismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom and the open future

Cohen

2022

Philosophical Books

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“…174-181), Field (2008, pp. 150-155), Grandjean (2021Grandjean ( , p. 1869. 7 See here Barnes (2010, pp.…”

Section: Vagueness and 'Classical Indeterminism'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Future Contingency and Classical Indeterminism

Gaskin

2021

Erkenn

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A position that has been called ‘classical indeterminism’ has recently been developed in order to model vagueness: this approach appeals to an object-language ‘determinately’ operator, the semantics of which are defined in such a way as to preserve the principle of bivalence. I suggest that a prominent argument against this strategy, which I call the Field–Williamson argument, fails. The classical indeterminist position in its general form was anticipated by the Aristotelian commentators in their discussions of Aristotle’s famous ‘sea battle’ passage concerning future contingency. But I maintain that, ironically enough, the strategy is less happily applied in this case, where a version of the Field–Williamson argument succeeds.

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“…Although the vast majority of philosophers of time tend to agree with the idea that the future is in some way or another open, there is disagreement about how the openness of the future should exactly be understood and what metaphysical theories of time best characterize this openness. The various theories of time in the literature model differently the openness of the future and have different understandings of what the openness itself amounts to (see Grandjean, 2021; Torre, 2011 for an overview of the debate). Here, I will focus on just one of those theories of time: a branching conception of time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Branching time and doomsday

Andreoletti

2021

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Branching-time is a popular theory of time that is intended to account for the openness of the future. Generally, branching-time models the openness of the future by positing a multiplicity of concrete alternative futures mirroring all the possible ways the future could unfold. A distinction is drawn in the literature among branching-time theories: those that make use of moment-based structures and those that employ history-based ones. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a particular kind of openness relative to the possibility that time ends (Doomsday). I then show that whereas moment-based branching structures cannot represent this kind of openness, history-based structures can account for it. The conclusion is that historybased structures score a point over moment-based ones.

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How is the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past to be characterized?

Cited by 15 publications

References 33 publications

Freedom and the open future

Freedom and the open future

Future Contingency and Classical Indeterminism

Branching time and doomsday

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